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QUESTION FOR REVIEW

Did the trial court and court of appeals err by
concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied
to this case?

REFERENCE TO COURT
OF APPEALS DECISION
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at
758 P.2d 451 (Ct.App. 1988).

A copy of the Slip Opinion is

attached as Exhibit A.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The decision of the court of appeals was entered on
July 8f 1988. A Petition for Rehearing was filed on July 21,
1988.

That petition was denied by the court of appeals on

August 3, 1988.
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred by Utah Code
Ann., §78-2-2(5) (Amended 1986).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Not applicable.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Trimble was a real estate brokerlandowner.

Fitzgerald was a land-buyer.

Monte Vista to Fitzgerald.
Monte Vista.

Monte Vista was a
Trimble introduced

Fitzgerald purchased land from

In schematic form, the relationships are as

follows:

In an earlier action, Trimble sued Fitzgerald for a
real estate commission.

The basis for that lawsuit was an

earnest money agreement between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista.
The earnest money agreement stated:
for all real estate commissions."
and this court affirmed.

"Buyer to be responsible

Trimble lost that trial

See generally, Mel Trimble Real

Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Ut. 1981) (copy attached
as Exhibit B ) .
After Trimble failed to collect a commission from
Fitzgerald (buyer), Trimble sued Monte Vista (seller) for a
2

commission growing out of the same transaction.

The basis

for the second lawsuit was an (admitted) oral listing
agreement wherein Monte Vista agreed to pay Trimble a six
percent commission if the property was sold.
Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, Id. at p. 453.

See Mel Trimble

This second

lawsuit was dismissed on grounds of Collateral Estoppel.
court of appeals affirmed.

The

(See Trimble v. Monte Vista

Ranch, at pg. 9, Exhibit A.)

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS WERE MISLED
BY CONFUSING LANGUAGE IN THE UTAH
SUPREME COURTfS PRIOR OPINION INVOLVING
ONLY THE BUYER (FITZGERALD) AND THE BROKER (TRIMBLE)
The first case (Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald) was an action by a broker (Trimble) against a buyer
(Fitzgerald) for a real estate commission.

The present case

(Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch) is a case by a broker
(Trimble) against the seller (Monte Vista) for a real estate
commission.

Obviously, the parties are different and the

issues are different.
estoppel.

Thus, there can be no collateral

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Slip

Opinion at p. 4 (Exhibit A ) .
3

The problem is that the trial court and the court of
appeals were both misled by confusing language of this
court's opinion.

Specifically, this court approved the

following language:
. • .[T]he agreement of December 7, 1977,
imposed upon defendant (Fitzgerald) the
liability for the real estate commission, if
any, owed plaintiff (Trimble) upon this
transaction. •*In the case of Trimble v. Monte Vista (Exhibit A ) ,
the trial court construed that language to mean that neither
Fitzgerald (buyer) nor Monte Vista (seller) owed Trimble a
commission.

Thus, the trial court stated:

The issue at the first trial and the present
issue are essentially the same, that is,
whether a real estate commission was due
(Trimble) from the sale of Monte Vista. . .
and if so, who should pay that commission.^
The court of appeals accepted that strained interpretation:
From all that appears in the Supreme Court
opinion,.the jury's judgment that Fitzgerald
(buyer) did not owe a commission(sic) means

1

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 526 P.2d at 455
(Exhibit B ) .
Exhibit C at p. 2.

4

that Trimble was not entitled to a commission
at all. . . 3
In short, both the trial court and the court of
appeals have interpreted this court's prior opinion to mean
that Trimble was not entitled to a commission from either
Fitzgerald (buyer) or Monte Vista (seller).
Of course, that is an absurd result.

That first

lawsuit was an action by Trimble (broker) against Fitzgerald
(buyer).

The seller (Monte Vista) was simply not involved in

Trimble's first lawsuit.4

Thusf there can be no collateral

estoppel.

POINT TWO
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
SO THAT THIS COURT CAN CLARIFY
ITS OWN AMBIGUOUS DECISION
This court's first decision was drafted by a very
elderly retired judge.

At best, the decision is obscure.

The first trial was conducted solely on the theory of
a third party beneficiary contract.

That is, Trimble

^Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Slip
Opinion at p. 5 (Exhibit A ) .
q

In the first trial, Fitzgerald (buyer) cross-claimed
against Monte Vista (seller) for unrelated matters.
5

(broker) claimed that he was a third party beneficiary to a
contract between Fitzgerald (buyer) and Monte Vista (seller)
The trial court refused to give the third party beneficiary
instruction.

This court affirmed.

(See Exhibit B.)

Inexplicably, this court failed to even analyze the
third-party beneficiary issue.

This court simply stated,

without analysis:
. . .[W]e think Instruction No. 8 fairly and
adequately covered the contentions of the
parties as they were presented to the court.
We find no error in giving Instruction No. 8
and in refusing to give appellant requested
Instruction No. 23."
626, P.2d at 455.
The confusing nature of the opinion has misled the
trial court and the court of appeals with respect to the
issue of collateral estoppel in this subsequent lawsuit.

If

the confusion originated in this court, only this court can

D

The earnest money contract between buyer and seller
states: "Buyer to be responsible for all real estate
commissions." See Mel Trimble Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d
at p. 454.
°This court also ignored Trimble's argument that a
third-party beneficiary contract is a two-party agreement;
however, the literal wording of Instruction No. 8 requires a
three-party agreement. (See Exhibit D, Appellant's Reply
Brief, at p. 5.)

6

clarify the confusion.

Certainly, Trimble should not suffer

because of an ambiguous or confusing opinion.

POINT THREE
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED
TO REVIEW ITS OWN RECORD BEFORE
RULING ON THE ISSUE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The opinion of the court of appeals focused on what
documents were available for the trial court to make its
decision.

The opinion infers that Trimble had a duty to

locate or submit additional documents to the court.
However, there was abundant evidence in the existing
record to negate the collateral estoppel issue.

The court of

appeals simply failed to look at its own record and failed to
evaluate Fitzgerald's citations to the record.
Early in the litigation, Ohran (seller) made a motion
to dismiss on the basis that Ohran (seller) was an indispensable party in the original action.

(R.17, R.20.) 7

Actually, that argument was simply a res judicata argument
under a different name.

(R.49, at Point III.)

In any case, the relationships in the earlier case
were explained to the trial judge in great detail.

(R.39,

(All citations to record included at Exhibit E.)
7

R.90.)

Indeed, plaintiff's entire trial brief from the

earlier trial was presented to the trial court.

(R.49.)

That document describes the relationships in graphic form.
It is possible that the lower court judges might have
been misled by an ambiguous opinion of this court.
the parties were not misled!

However,

Monte Vista knows full well

that it was not a party in the first lawsuit!

It is a matter

of extreme bad faith for Monte Vista to rely on an ambiguous
opinion from this court.

Monte Vista should have conceded

that it was not a party in the first lawsuit.

If certiorari

is not granted, Monte Vista will simply profit from its own
bad faith.
DATED this

^

day of

^ef^h

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
s*
/*

Js

I certify that on the

,

day of

/

j^JC

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI (Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.), was mailed,
postage prepaid, by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S
mail, to the following:
M* Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 888
Provo, Utah
84603
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EXHIBIT A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

—

Mel Trimble Real Estate,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. and
Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson,
Howard D. Sherwood, et al.,

Case No. 86Q135-CA

Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Jacks on.

FILED
aryT. Noonan
Cleric of the Court
Court of Appeats

ORME, Judge:

In an earlier case, Mel Trimble Real Estate and its agent
sued Leland Fitzgerald for a real estate sales commission
allegedly owed. Trimble was unsuccessful in that action and
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed in Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Fitzoerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). Trimble then brought
this action to recover the commission against Monte Vista
Ranch, Inc., which contracted to sell the property to
Fitzgerald, and its shareholders. Monte Vista's motion for
summary judgment was granted on res judicata grounds. Trimble
appeals from the lower court's grant of the motion for summary
judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1977, Monte Vista's president, Wallace Ohran, engaged
Trimble to sell Monte Vista's ranch property located in Cedar
Valley, Utah. Ohran orally agreed that Monte Vista would pay
Trimble a 6% sales commission. Trimble located a buyer,
Fitzgerald, who negotiated with Monte Vista regarding the
purchase price. Initially, Monte Vista offered to sell the
ranch for $2,000,000 and to pay Trimble's commission. The
final offer, to which Fitzgerald agreed, included a reduction
in price to $1,875,000, on the condition that Fitzgerald would
pay Trimble's commission. An earnest money agreement, which
both Monte Vista and Fitzgerald signed, stated that the

*[b]uyer [was] to be responsible for all real estate
commissions." However, it did not specify how much Trimble was
to be paid or the terms of payment. Trimble was not a party to
the earnest money agreement.
The ranch was Monte Vista's major asset and, for tax
purposes, Fitzgerald ultimately agreed to a transfer of
corporate stock instead of a transfer of the title to the
property itself. Accordingly, Monte Vista's shareholders
entered into a stock sale agreement with Fitzgerald. The stock
sale agreement contained an integration clause which explicitly
stated that this subsequent agreement "constitutes the entire
agreement among the parties" and "supersedes all prior
agreements." The stock sale agreement was silent on the issue
of commissions.
A dispute ensued as to whether Fitzgerald's earlier
agreement to pay Trimble the commission was still in effect or
whether it had been agreed instead that Trimble could buy part
of the ranch on favorable terms in lieu of a commission.
Trimble declined to purchase any part of the ranch and demanded
a cash commission. Fitzgerald paid $5000 toward Trimble's
commission but refused to pay more. Trimble then sued
Fitzgerald on the ground that it was a third party beneficiary
of the earnest money agreement. In that action, a jury
concluded that Fitzgerald did not owe anything to Trimble and
the trial court's decision based on the verdict was upheld by
the Utah Supreme Court in Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981).
Following the conclusion of the litigation against
Fitzgerald, Trimble filed this suit against Monte Vista and its
former shareholders alleging breach of contract and the right
to recover the balance of the unpaid commission. The five
named shareholders filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied. Monte Vista moved for summary judgment on a number of
grounds, including res judicata and collateral estoppel, and
attached to its supporting memorandum a copy of the Utah
Supreme Court opinion affirming the judgment in the prior
trial. The former shareholders joined in the motion.
The entirety of Trimble's opposition to the summary
judgment motion, insofar as premised on res judicata and
collateral estoppel, consisted of a single paragraph disputing,
in conclusory terms, Monte Vista's argument that the question
of whether any commission was owed to Trimble had been
litigated in the first action and decided adversely to
Trimble. The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment, albeit originally on only statute of limitations

860135-CA
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grounds. For reasons which are not altogether clear, the
resulting judgment was set aside.
The motion for summary judgment, insofar as premised on
other grounds, was then resubmitted. Additional memoranda were
submitted and the motion orally argued, but Trimble offered no
other information relative to the res judicata issue. The
court issued a memorandum decision determining that the action
was precluded on res judicata grounds. In making its decision,
the court relied, as had the parties, exclusively on the
Supreme Court1s reported decision in the earlier case.
Trimble's appeal is premised on several grounds, which we
regard as raising three points. First, even if it was
appropriate for the district court to decide the res judicata
question with reference only to the Supreme Court's opinion, it
erred in finding in that opinion any basis for concluding that
the commission issue raised in the present action had already
been decided adversely to Trimble. Second, the district court
should not have looked just to the opinion but should have
scrutinized the pleadings and papers in the first action to see
what issues were actually litigated and how they were decided.
Third, this court should, in any event, take judicial notice of
the pleadings and papers in the prior action in evaluating the
propriety of the district court's decision in this case.
Before turning to consider these issues, we pause briefly to
review the doctrine of res judicata.
I. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of res judicata reflects the refusal of
courts to tolerate pointless litigation and is based on the
premise that the proper administration of justice is best
served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or
cause. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395 (1969). H[R]es judicata
and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources,
and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance
on adjudication." Allen v. McCurrv, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
The doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses. Penrod
v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983);
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). The first branch, now known as claim
preclusion but referred to previously as MpureM res judicata,
bars the relitigation by the parties or their privies of a
claim for relief previously resolved by a final judgment on the
merits. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875.

860135-CA
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See, e.g. , Braselton v. Clearfield State Bank, 606 F.2d 285,
287 (10th Cir. 1979). "The same rule also prevents
relitigation of claims that could and should have been
litigated in the prior action but were not." Penrod v. Nu
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875. Under claim preclusion,
the judgment is final and serves as the full measure for relief
to be accorded between the same parties on the same claim or
cause of action. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4402 (1977).
The second branch of res judicata is collateral estoppel,
or issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, the relitigation of
factual issues that have once been litigated and decided is
precluded even if the claims for relief in the two actions are
different, Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d at 875,
and even if only "the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication." Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d
at 390 (emphasis in original). This case turns on application
of the collateral estoppel doctrine since Monte Vista and its
shareholders were not parties to the prior action but, rather,
contend the issue of whether any commission was owed had been
litigated in that action and decided adversely to Trimble, who
was a party to the prior action.
In Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah
1978), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the following test to
determine whether collateral estoppel applies:
1) Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
2) Was there a final judgment on the
merits?
3) Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?
4) Was the issue in the first case
competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
If all four elements of the test are satisfied, collateral
estoppel bars relitigation of the same issue. In this case,
Trimble, the party against whom the commission issue was
allegedly decided, was a party to the prior action and that
action resulted in a final judgment on the merits adverse to

860135-CA
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Trimble. It remains to be seen whether the other two elements
of the test were satisfied, i.e., whether the pertinent factual
issue decided in the prior action is identical to the key issue
in this case and whether it had been actually litigated.
II. SUPREME COURT OPINION
The district court premised its collateral estoppel
conclusions strictly on the Supreme Court's opinion in the
prior action. According to the opinion, the Supreme Court
reviewed the trial transcript and determined that the litigants
enjoyed a "fair and full trial, without prejudicial error."
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d at 455.
Trimble's theory at trial was that Fitzgerald owed Trimble a
monetary commission in the amount of $125,000.00. !£. at 454.
According to the opinion, the trial court had occasion to
determine "as a matter of law" that the "agreement . . .
imposed upon [Fitzgerald] the liability for the real estate
commission, if any, owed [Trimble] upon this transaction." Id.
at 455.
Trimble's contention on this appeal that the trial
courtfs "as a matter of law" ruling was really not one or was
entirely gratuitous, is simply not persuasive, at least when
the opinion is considered by itself. It is surely appropriate
to conclude the trial court would not have ruled that i_f any
commission were owed it was owed by Fitzgerald, unless that
question had been presented and litigated. From all that
appears in the Supreme Court opinion, the iurv's judgment that
Fitzgerald did not owe a commission means that Trimble was not
entitled to a commission at all—and that collateral estoppel
would properly bar this action to recover such a commission.1
III. RECOURSE TO RECORD IN PRIOR ACTION
Trimble argues, however, that the Supreme Court opinion
is misleading and that the district court in the instant
1. Trimble's decision not to join Monte Vista or its
shareholders in the action it commenced against Fitzgerald
tends to suggest Trimble knew* that, aside from whatever
commissions other parties might owe, no commission was owed by
Monte Vista or its shareholders. Where a party has a claim
against one or more from among several parties, it is customary
to join all of those parties in a single action and leave the
factfinder to determine which of them actually is liable. That
practice also saves "the parties and the judicial system
considerable time and money." Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr.,
Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah 1987).
860135-CA
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proceeding should not have decided the collateral estoppel
question based solely on the opinion. Trimble contends that it
is difficult to make a determination that the issue was
actually litigated and decided from the four corners of the
opinion. We tend to agree. Close examination of the record in
a proceding may well lead to a conclusion somewhat at odds with
the apparent "plain meaning" of a reported decision. See,
e.g., Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Trimble armies nn *ppp^] fhat- f^e rH sfrirt- nnnr^

in this case

should have examined the record from the first proceeding's
this examination would show that Trimble's second complaijit
faisea new causes of action based on facts which had not -b^en
actually litigated and which did not depend for its success 6n
any factual issues decided adversely to Trimble in tjig_jg£gpt
action.
The strongest support for Trimble's position is Parrish
v. Lavton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975)/ where the
Court stated: "Since the record of the prior action was not
before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the
determination that plaintiffs claim was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata." .Id. at 1087. However, Parrish is readily
distinguishable from the case at hand because the trial court
in Parrish, without the record of the prior proceeding, had
absolutely no basis for determining the res judicata issue.2
2. Parrish was a 3-2 decision. It turned on a lack of
compliance with rules of evidence and procedure "by which a
judicial record may be proved." Parrish v. Layton City Corp.,
542 P.2d at 1087. The dissenters pointed out that, absent a
transcript on appeal, the court should presume the judge had
the appropriate records before him since appellant had the
burden of proving otherwise. I£. at 1089 (Ellett, J.,
dissenting). Parrish was referred to in dicta in Searle Bros.
v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978), as support for the
proposition that the trial court should not have decided the
applicability of res judicata doctrines without independently
examining the record of the prior litigation. Searle was also
a 3-2 decision and, interestingly, the author of the Parrish
majority opinion joined the dissent.
We do not read Parrish and Searle as imposing an
affirmative obligation on the court to independently consider
the record in the prior litigation, regardless of the
procedural posture in which a collateral estoppel issue arises
and the position taken and tactics adopted by the resisting
party. Such a requirement would be especially inappropriate in
a case like this, where both parties1 handling of the summary
judgment motion clearly suggested that the collateral estoppel
question could be properly decided by reference to some other
source, namely the reported Supreme Court opinion.
860135-CA
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By contrast, in the instant case the Supreme Court opinion
provides a basis upon which the district court could determine
that collateral estoppel barred the instant action.
As we see it, once Monte Vista submitted to the district
court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion, which on its face
showed that the key issue had been litigated and decided, the
burden shifted to Trimble, if it believed more than the opinion
was needed to make a fully informed decision, to produce the
record of the prior proceeding, urge the court to take judicial
notice of it, or otherwise show that the opinion should not be
taken at face value. Instead, Trimble limited its resistance
to arguing how the Supreme Court opinion should actually be
construed and to the doctrinal requirements of collateral
estoppel. An analogous situation is when an affidavit is
submitted to the court in support of a motion for summary
judgment. If the resisting party believes the affidavit is
inaccurate or incomplete, that party may move to strike it or
may submit a counteraffidavit. But if that party limits its
response to arguing what the facts in movant's affidavit mean
and to legal arguments, the court will rightly conclude that
its disposition may properly turn on the affidavit which was
submitted. The trial court in this case was likewise led to
believe that the opinion was all that'it needed to decide the
collateral estoppel aspect of the motion for summary judgment.
Trimble's argument that the court should not have
decided the motion without review of the record in the prior
proceeding must additionally be rejected for the reason that
that issue was never raised before the trial court and is
raised for the first time on appeal, see, e.g., Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 657
(Utah 1988), an issue revisited in the next section.
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Finally, Trimble argues that the rule on judicial notice
permits—or even requires—this court to take notice of the
record in the first proceeding and to evaluate the district
court's decision in light of what the record actually shows.
This issue is a difficult one, as Utah R. Evid. 201 does not
explicitly allow or prohibit the taking of judicial notice for
the first time on appeal.

860135-CA
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Rule 201, which governs judicial notice of adjudicative
facts,3 provides in subsection (c) that -[a] court may take
judicial notice, whether requested or not." However, under
subsection (d) a court is required to "take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information." Moreover, the rule specifically provides in
subsection (f) that M[j]udicial notice may be taken at any
stage of the proceeding."
Trimble argues that since it has requested this court to
take notice of the proceeding and has supplied us with the
-necessary information," we are obligated to take judicial
notice since notice may be taken at "any stage of the
proceeding," This argument is plausible, see 21 C. Wright &
K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977),
but creates a dilemma. "Where the issue of judicial notice is
raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court is
faced with a conflict between the policy that decisions ought
not to run contrary to indisputable facts and the procedural
policy that prohibits a party from raising issues on appeal
that were not raised below." 1&. See People v. Bush, 37 Cal.
App.3d 952, 112 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974) (under California
Evidence Code § 459, court cannot take notice for first time on
appeal of a matter not noticed below in order to permit a party
to assert a legal theory not presented to the trial court).
See also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d at 657.
We agree that the better interpretation limits mandatory
judicial notice to the trial court. See 21 C. Wright & K.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977).
See also Holbrook v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 288, 431 P.2d 123, 125
(1967). It remains to be decided whether we should take
judicial notice of the record in the prior proceeding for the
first time, as a matter of discretion.
For us to take notice of the record in the first
proceeding would permit the concept of judicial notice to be
used to get around the rule precluding raising issues for the
first time on appeal. Utah courts have consistently followed a
policy strongly opposed to the raising of issues for the first
3. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. See Advisory
Committee Note, Utah R. Evid. 201. The rule "'governs only
judicial notice of adjudicative facts,1 and does not deal with
instances in which a court may notice legislative facts, which
is left to the sound discretion of trial and appellate
courts." id. See Utah R. Evid. 201(a).

860135-CA

8

time on appeal. See, e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (rule applies
even where facts are not disputed and issue raised is one of
law); Banaerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983);
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P,2d 1019, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
There are only very limited exceptions to that sound policy.
One such exception allows an appellate court to affirm trial
court decisions on proper grounds other than those which the
trial court cited in making its decision. Buehner Block Co. v.
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). 4 Another
limited exception exists when to do otherwise would permit
deviation from a legislative scheme. Cox Rock Products v.
Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). We see no compelling "countervailing principle" to be
served by making an exception in this case, see id., even
though under Rule 201 we would have the power to take judicial
notice for the first time and, indeed, might do so in an
appropriate case. See Note 4, supra. We therefore decline to
take notice of the record in the prior proceeding for the
purpose of looking behind the Supreme Court's opinion and
evaluating the district court's decision in light of
information not presented to it.
CONCLUSION
A plain reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in the
earlier case shows that Trimble's claim to any commission has
already been litigated and decided adversely to Trimble* Since
the parties all but conceded that the opinion alone would
permit the district court to make an informed decision on the
applicability of collateral estoppel, the trial court did not
err in failing to review the record of the prior proceeding on
its own motion. It is not mandatory that we take notice of the
record in that proceeding for the first time on appeal, and we
decline to do so as a matter of discretion in view of the
strong policy in this state against consideration of arguments
4. Under Buehner Block, it might be appropriate to take notice
for the first time on appeal if doing so would permit
affirmance. Cf. 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 5110 at 525 (1977) ("most facts that are noticed
for the first time on appeal will undoubtedly be noticed in
order to avoid a reversal"). However, we are asked here to
notice matters not raised before the trial court for the
purpose of reversing the trial court.

860135-CA
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and issues for the first time on appeal.
from is accordingly affirmed.
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MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE, and
Cal Florence, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Leland A. FITZGERALD, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16746.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 13, 1981.

Broker and sales agent brought action
against purchaser for real estate sales commission. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Harding, District Judge, held that: (1) in case
in which earnest money agreement between
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to
be responsible for all real estate commissions," instruction given by the court fairly
and adequately covered the contentions of
the parties as they were presented to the
court, and there was no error in refusing to
give requested instruction on theory that
broker was a third-party beneficiary in earnest money agreement, and (2) issues as to
sales commission claimed by broker and
whether there should have been any sales
commission at all were for the jury.
Affirmed.

1. Contracts <s=>187(l)
It is essential for a third-party beneficiary claimant to prove that contract was
intended to benefit him directly; one incidentally benefited by performance of a
promise to a third person may not maintain
an action against the promissor.
2. Contracts <&=>187(1)
Terms of agreement and facts circumstances that surround its making can be
examined to determine whether supposed
third-party beneficiary of contract was in
fact intended to be such.

3. Brokers
88(7)
In action against purchaser for real
estate sales commission in case in which
earnest money agreement between vendor
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be responsible for all real estate commissions,"
instruction given by the court fairly and
adequately covered the contentions of the
parties as they were presented to the court,
and there was no error in refusing to give
requested instruction on theory that broker
was a third-party beneficiary in earnest
money agreement.
4. Brokers <s=>88(l)
In action by broker and sales agent
against purchaser for real estate sales commission, issues as to sales commission
claimed by broker and whether there should
be any sales commission at all were for the
jury.
Robert J. DeBry and Dale F. Gardiner,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Lawrence E. Corbridge, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and respondent.
HARDING, District Judge:
This appeal is from an adverse judgment
on a claim for a real estate sales commission.
Appellants were in the business of selling
real estate. Mel Trimble was a licensed
real estate broker, and Cal Florence was
employed by Trimble as a sales agent. The
appellants will be referred to herein jointly
as Florence.
The ranch property involved in this action
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and was
under the management and control of Wallace Ohran. Respondent Leland A. Fitzgerald was a rancher.
Two or three years prior to December,
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an oral
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch property. The terms of the oral listing allowed
Florence to seek offers, and if any offer
was accepted by Ohran, a six percent commission would be paid on the sale.
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In (MOIMT, 11)77, through the efforts of
Florence, Fitzgerald became interested in a
part of the ranch and an offer was made to
Ohran. The offer was unacceptable to Ohran. About December 1, 1977, there was a
meeting of Ohran, Fitzgerald and Florence
in which Ohran told Fitzgerald he would
sell the ranch for $2,000,000, and that he
would pay the sales commission of six percent from the proceeds of the sale. During
the course of their discussion, Ohran said
that he would reduce the sale price of the
ranch to $1,875,000 if Fitzgerald would pay
the commission. Fitzgerald agreed to this
proposal. Nothing was put in writing at
this time.
On December 7, 1977, Ohran, Fitzgerald,
Florence and other interested persons met
in American Fork, Utah, in an effort to
effect a final sales agreement and to reduce
it to writing. Up to this time, there had
been no binding contract for a real estate
listing, a sales commission, nor for the sale
of any property. At this meeting, further
discussions ensued. A sales commission for
$125,000 to Florence was mentioned. Florence asked that there be two earnest money
agreements: one for Fitzgerald's part of
the ranch, and the other for Florence's part
of the ranch. Ohran said there would have
to be one entire sale. Fitzgerald and Florence retired to another room to discuss the
matter between themselves. The testimony
is conflicting as to what was discussed at
this private conference. About one-half
hour later, when they rejoined the others,
Fitzgerald said that he would take title to
the property and would take care of Florence.
Thereupon, an earnest money agreement
was made and executed between Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc. (Ohran's principal) and
Fitzgerald for the sale of the ranch for
$1,875,000. The agreement had a provision
stating, "Buyer to be responsible for all real
estate commissions." No further particulars were discussed at the meeting nor stated in the earnest money agreement with
respect to a real estate sales commission.
1. Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731
(1938); 129 A.L.R. 164.

I*ilcr that evening, Fitzgerald and Florence had a discussion concerning the purchase that had been made of the ranch, but
their testimony is conflicting as to any determination. However, Fitzgerald did give
Florence a check for $5,000. Their testimony is in conflict as to what the check was
for
On August 7, 1978, appellant filed a complaint, alleging that he and Fitzgerald had
jointly purchased the assets of the Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc., that he was entitled to an
accounting, and demanded judgment for his
share of the assets. The theory upon which
the original complaint was based was later
abandoned, and an amended complaint was
filed praying for a sales commission in money only of $125,000. The case went to trial
with a jury on the latter theory. A verdict
against appellant was returned, upon which
judgment was entered. The court denied
appellant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial
[1,2] Appellant contends that the court
erred in failing to give a requested instruction, No. 23, on the specific theory that he
was a third-party beneficiary in the earnest
money agreement between the seller and
Fitzgerald, the buyer of the ranch property.
In this regard, it is essential for a third-party beneficiary claimant to prove that the
contract was intended to benefit him directly. One incidently benefited by the performance of a promise to a third person
may not maintain an action against the
promisor. The terms of the agreement and
the facts and circumstances that surrounded its making can be examined to determine whether the supposed beneficiary was
in fact intended to be such.1
The court gave Instruction No. 8, to
which appellant excepted. The portions of
this instruction relevant here are as folio***
The controversy centers around an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
agreement dated December 7, 1977, by
which the corporate owner of the ranch
agreed to sell it to defendant for the
price stated therein.
Among other

WAITERS y '. QUERRY
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things, this agreement contained a provision that defendant, Laland [sic] A. Fitzgerald, as buyer was to be responsible for
all real estate commissions....
.. . the court has ruled as a matter of
law that the agreement of December 7,
1977, imposed upon defendant the liability for the real estate commission, if any,
owed plaintiffs upon this transaction.
Normally, the amount of any such commission would have been as fixed by
agreement between the real estate salesman and the parties to the earnest money
agreement and should your determination
from the evidence be that in this case
such was done and agreed to at the time
of the execution of that agreement, no
one could unilaterally change the agreement, and you should return your verdict
accordingly; but should your determination be that while defendant agreed with
the seller to be responsible for all real
estate commissions at the time the agreement was signed, but that at that time
Cal Florence and Leland Fitzgerald were
still negotiating with each other with respect to the nature of the transaction as
between themselves and how and in what
manner and in what amount any such
commission was to be paid, you are instructed that they could between themselves make an agreement thereon by
which each would be bound irrespective
of the intent or belief of the seller, and
once such agreement was made, neither
could change that agreement without the
consent of the other.
Thus, it is your responsibility to determine from the evidence what amount, if
any, is owed by defendant to plaintiffs.
The burden is upon the plaintiffs to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the
basis for, and the amount of, their claim.
[3] After reading the transcript of the
trial proceedings, including the testimony of
the witnesses, and considering the theories
of the parties and the applicable law, we
think Instruction No. 8 fairly and adequately covered the contentions of the parties as
they were presented to the court. We find
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case before
his retirement, January 5, 1981.

no error in giving Instruction No. 8, and in
refusing to give appellants' requested Instruction No. 23.
[4] Appellants' assertion of error in failing to direct a verdict of liability against
the defendant is without merit, since there
were sharp conflicts in the testimony on the
issue of the sales commission claimed by
Florence, or whether there should have
been a sales commission at all.
The record shows that the verdict of the
jury was based on competent, relevant, and
admissible evidence; that the trial judge
supported the verdict by his denial of appellants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial; and
that he accorded to the litigants a fair and
full trial, without prejudicial error.
Affirmed. Costs to respondents.
HALL, STEWART and CROCKETT,*
JJ., and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur.
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HOWE, J., do not
participate herein.
HENRIOD, Retired Justice, and HARDING, Retired District Judge, sat.

O |

^NUMBERSYSTEM>

Lisa WATTERS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Clayton N. QUERRY, Jean C. Querry,
Charles L Querry, Elizabeth Hemingway, and David E. Hemingway, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 16897.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 17, 1981.
Plaintiff sued defendant, whose car
had rear-ended plaintiffs, and codefendant,
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David Sam

JUDGE

This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and is considered pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice
of the District Courts.
R U L I N G
When examined under the doctrine of res judicata, it is apparent
the case at bar rests on the same state of facts and evidence of the
same character as were presented in Mel Trimble Real Estate et al v.
Leland A. Fitzgerald, Civil No. C-78-4944.

The trial court in that

case, after hearing the witnesses who would appear and viewing the
documents that would be introduced in this suit, ruled as a matter
of law, that Fitzgerald was solely liable for any real estate commission that may have been owed Florence.

The jury sitting in that

action was so instructed after the court explicitly rejected an instruction related to third party beneficiary contracts.

Undoubtedly

^GE TWO
60,784

he precise issue at bar was fully and finally litigated
our day trial which resulted
ue F l o r e n c e .

in the

in a verdict that no commission

On a p p e a l , the Utah Supreme Court

was

upheld the

ecision finding no error in the trial court's ruling or

instruction.

lei Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .

This

:ourt clearly lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n to review the a p p l i c a t i o n of law
)r findings of fact in that case and consequently

lacks

to relitigate the issue of liability for the alleged

jurisdiction

commission.

T h e r e f o r e , the instant action is barred under the doctrine of res
judicata.
M o r e o v e r , even if this suit could be characterized

as arising

from a cause of action different from that p r e v i o u s l y tried, it is
barred under the d o c t r i n e of collateral estoppel as adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d

1337, 1340,

1341 ( 1 9 8 3 ) .

adjudication

Clearly, the "issue decided in the prior

was identical with the one presented
1340.

in t h [ i s ] a c t i o n . . . ."

Id.at

Xhe--isrQ€SFa.t'-''t"fi"e^fir"st trial and the present issue are

essejT^jy.lx.the:rs^mejrJ^^Jli.s»

w h e t h e r a real e s t a t e commission

due F l o r e n c e fronr the-~sale"of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. (Monte

was

Vista),

and^rf^rs'o"7r'who' shoald^pay the..commissi on./ The record shows that
defendant Ohran testified at that trial and was present for cross
e x a m i n a t i o n , and that evidence of the event surrounding the t r a n s action was fully p r e s e n t e d .

This court is unaware of any

occurence

PAGE THREE
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subsequent to the previous trial or appeal that would lead to the
introduction of evidence not fully considered in the previous action.
Secondly, the previous case was "decided on its merits." j_d_.
at 1341.

Although the Utah Supreme Court was unable to determine

from the record the exact nature of the dealings between

Florence

and Fitzgerald,, the court noted several facts that cast serious doubt
on whether any money that passed or would have passed between them
should be characterized as a commission.

Apparently, even after

defendant Ohran, as seller, reduced the sales price offered by the
amount of the claimed commission (upon Fitzgerald's agreement to
pay i t ) , Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were still

negotiating

as to their possible joint purchase of the assets of Monte Vista.
Irrespective of the actual agreement that emerged between

Fitzgerald

and Florence, this court is persuaded, as were the courts hearing the
previous action, that liability for the commission cannot be imputed
to the defendant Ohran.
Thirdly, there can be no serious claim that the issue in the
first case was not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated." _I_d.
As stated above, the Utah Supreme Court found no reversible errors
in the previous jury trial that lasted four days and included
testimony from and

opportunity

relevant to this action.

to cross examine all the witnesses

Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has

abandoned the rule requiring mutuality of the parties in a collateral

PAGE FOUR
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estoppel

case.

"The e s t a b l i s h e d

rule is that a s t r a n g e r to a

j u d g m e n t may assert a judgment against one who a c t u a l l y

litigated

an issue that was n e c e s s a r i l y decided by the j u d g m e n t and
p r e c l u d e the r e l i t i g a t i o n of the same i s s u e . "
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) .
mutuality

thereby

S e a r l e v. S e a r l e ,

The e x c e p t i o n to the r e q u i r e m e n t

is p a r t i c u l a r l y just in the case at bar w h e r e

defendant

Ohran seeks to use the prior judgment as a shield to avoid
in this suit b e c a u s e his alleged

of

liability

liability would depend on fact and

law p r e v i o u s l y d e t e r m i n e d and a p p l i e d .

T h e r e f o r e , even if this suit

could be treated as arising from a cause of a c t i o n d i f f e r e n t

from

that u n d e r l y i n g the p r e v i o u s a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f is b a r r e d , u n d e r the
doctrine of c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l , from b r i n g i n g

its claim

against

defendants.
Based upon the f o r e g o i n g , it is

clear to this court that

p l a i n t i f f is barred from b r i n g i n g this action a g a i n s t the

instant

defendants.
A c c o r d i n g l y , d e f e n d a n t s ' M o t i o n to D i s m i s s
p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint

is granted,

is dismissed with p r e j u d i c e .

Costs to

defendants.
>ated this _ J ^ £ y J u n e ,

1985

rt^r^v
^z±r=rrriL
DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Robert B. Hansen

and

EXHIBIT D

SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS
Plaintiff brought this action against Monte Vista
Ranch, Inc. and its former shareholders to collect a real
estate

commission

(R.

1-4).

The

shareholders

sold

the

corporation's assets (consisting mainly of real property) to
Leland Fitzgerald by selling their stock in Monte Vista (R.
182-195).

Plaintiff

procured

the

sale

(R.

152) .

The

Earnest Money Agreement between Monte Vista and its former
shareholders and Leland Fitzgerald required Fitzgerald to
pay plaintiff's real estate commission (R. 152). In a prior
action,

plaintiff

sued

Fitzgerald

for

his

commission.

Plaintiff first alleged that he had some kind of a joint
purchase agreement with Fitzgerald (R. 153, 253). Plaintiff
later amended that pleading to simply sue for a commission
(R. 153) .
Plaintiff
Fitzgerald.

The

lost

record

the

does not

prior

action

show what

specific defense to plaintiff's claims was

against

Fitzgerald's

(R. 253).

The

trial court in this case acknowledged that the basis of the
decision against plaintiff on his claim against Fitzgerald
was unclear (Id.)
In its memorandum decision, the trial court refers
to Wallace Ohran.
a major

Mr. Ohran was Monte Vista's president and

shareholder before the sale to Fitzgerald.

The

other individual defendants are Monte Vista's other former
shareholders (R. 182-195).

Neither Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.

nor its former shareholders were sued by plaintiff in the
prior action (R. 17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants did not introduce any evidence of what
:he prior case was all about.

They relied solely on the

reported appellate decision of the prior case.

That deci-

sion does not reveal what the underlying issues really were
.n the prior case.

Thus, defendants did not meet their

>urden of showing that no material issue of fact on the res
udicata and collateral estoppel claims.

The trial court

elied upon defendants' incomplete submission and reached
he wrong result.
The determination that the trial court erred can
e made from the materials of record in this case.
The State of Frauds does not preclude recovery
scause Ohran admitted the existence of plaintiff's contract
n court and because

the "contract was fully performed,

iditionally, the sale ultimately became a sale of stock to
lich the Statute of Frauds does not apply rather than a
lie of real property.
POINT I
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS
BASED UPON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION
Defendants

admitted

plaintiff

did not

file any

mplaint against Monte Vista Ranch or its former shareholds in the prior action (R. 17) .
2

Defendants admitted that

Fitzgerald

filed

Vista's

former

a

third-party

shareholders

complaint
IR.

against

17).

Monte

Fitzgerald's

third-party complaint in the prior action was for indemnification from Monte Vista's former shareholders if plaintiff
recovered from Fitzgerald (R. 17).
The issues in Fitzgerald's third-party indemnification

suit

plaintiff

were

asserted

completely
against

different

Fitzgerald.

original brief, pp. 14-16).

than
(See

the

issues

plaintiff's

The indemnification suit was

based upon language in the stock purchase agreement between
Fitzgerald

and Monte Vista's

former

shareholders

to the

effect that each party would reimburse the other for any
liability for commissions (R. 189). Such an arrangement was
circular.

Under those terms, ultimate payment would depend

on whom plaintiff sued first.

But the Earnest Money Agree-

ment between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former shareholders clearly

stated that as between Monte Vista's former

shareholders and Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald would be responsible
(R. 152).

Thus, the court in the prior action ruled that

Fitzgerald would be liable to plaintiff (R. 155).
This ruling was referred to in a jury instruction
(R. 155) .

Both in its ruling on res judicata and in its

ruling on collateral estoppel, the trial court assumed that
one result of the prior action was that "the courts hearing
the previous action" were persuaded " that liability for the
commission cannot be imputed to the defendant Ohran" (R.

51-254, quoting

from 253).

A copy of the trail court's

rder is attached as Exhibit "A".
As

against

plaintiff,

the

courts

in

the

prior

ction could not and did not make that determination because
laintiff did not bring any claim against Monte Vista or its
hareholders

in

that

prior

action

(R.

17) .

The

trial

ourt's ruling was based upon an assumption that was clearly
rroneous.
POINT II
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE RECORD
OF THE PRIOR CASE BEFORE IT
Defendant argues that the rule that the court must
ndependently

examine

the

record

of

a prior

case

before

aking a res judicata or collateral estoppel ruling is not
pplicable because there was a reported appellate decision
f the case against Fitzgerald.
Jthority for their argument.

Defendants did not cite any
Further, collateral estoppel

id res judicata require a showing that the issues in the
trior case and the pending one are the same.
. Searlef

588 P.2d

689

(Utah 1978).

Searle Bros.

Even if defendants

Duld rely on a reported decision, any such opinion would
ave to be complete enough to make that determination.

It

5 not enough to just show plaintiff lost.
The

record

in

this

case

demonstrates

that

the

sported decision, Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald,
16 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981), was not complete enough to make a
roper determination of collateral estoppel.

The reported

decision mentioned plaintiff1s contention that the verdict
should

have

been

directed

in his

favor.

But

the

court

disposed of that argument without specifying what the actual
claims of the parties were.

The majority of the reported

decision simply dealt with the adequacy of a jury instruction.

The appellate decision did not go into

significant

detail on specific allegations or specific conclusions.
The trial court admitted in its memorandum decision that it did not know what the actual arrangement was
between plaintiff and Fitzgerald:
Although the Utah Supreme was unable to
determine from the record the exact
nature of the dealings between Florence
and Fitzgerald, the court noted several
facts
that
cast
serious
doubt
on
whether any money that passed or would
have passed between them should be
characterized
as a commission
(upon
Fitzgerald1s
agreement
to
pay i t ) ,
Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were
still negotiating as to their possible
joint purchase of the assets of Monte
Vista.
(R. 253).
After expressing this uncertainty, the trial court
clearly showed that its decision on collateral estoppel as
well as res judicata was based on its assumption that the
court made a determination that Monte Vista 1 s former shareholders did not owe anybody (including plaintiff) anything:
Irrespective of the actual agreement
that emerged between Fitzgerald
and
Florence, this court is persuaded, as
were the courts hearing tY\^ previous
action, that liability for th<* commission cannot be imputed to the defendant
Qhran" [Monte Vista ! s former shareholder J .
(R. 253).

As
Defendants

we

have

shown,

admitted

that

plaintiff

conclusion

did

not

was

wrong,

an

action

bring

against Monte Vista or its former shareholder in the prior
action (R. 17). Thus determination that Monte Vista and its
former

shareholders

owed

nothing

to plaintiff

could

not

possibly have been made.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF
Defendants argue that plaintiff is, nevertheless,
collaterally

estopped

from

asserting

any

claims

against

yionte Vista or its former shareholders because the prior
action

at

least

determined

plaintiff anything.
a

PP^Yf

w

that

Fitzgerald

did

not

owe

But, before collateral estoppel could

^ would need to know why the prior court made that

iecision.

We would need to know what the precise issues

tfere. Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 689 (Utah 1983).
The fact that plaintiff did the work which procured the sale is not disputed.

The Earnest Money Agreement

establishes that fact by specifying that plaintiff's commission should be taken care of

(R. 152) .

The record also

establishes that plaintiff was only paid $5,000 (R. 154) on
tfhat was at least a $1,400,000 sale (R. 185).
By specifying that plaintiff's real estate commission

was

to

be

paid,

defendants

acknowledged

plaintiff

procured the sale and earned a commission of some kind (R.
152) .

The record also contains a six page transcript from

Wallace Chran's deposition in the prior case (R. 81-87), a
copy of which is attached as

Exhibit "B" hereto).

In that

transcript, Ohran admits that the shareholders at one time
agreed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission (R. 81) .
The trial court did not understand the basis for
the decision in the prior case (R. 25 3).

We have shown that

it could not have been based on failure to perform, or
payment which would be the usual reasons.

The record in

this case shows that plaintiff and Fitzgerald were negotiating some kind of a joint purchase of the subject property
that never took place (R. 146-147, 154, 253).
It was defendants1 burden to show that collateral
estoppel applies.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d
(Utah 1979) .

1332

Mere assertions that no genuine fact question

exists are no more valid than mere assertions that a fact
question exists.

See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah

1983).
For collateral estoppel to apply, defendants would
have to show what the precise issues

in the prior case

were —

Defendants did not

not just that plaintiff lost.

introduce any evidence on what the underlying contentions
and facts were in the prior case and relied solely on the
incomplete

reported

brief, pp.11-14).

decision.

(See plaintiff's

original

Defendants did not meet their burden.

After reviewing defendants1 authorities, plaintiff
acknowledges that defendants are probably right when they

:gue the material not in the record

(Exhibits C and D to

Laintiffs brief in chief) cannot be considered on appeal,
it the trial

court erred by

imilar material.

ruling without

considering

The record in this case demonstrates that

efendants did not meet their burden of showing

that no

aterial fact issue exits concerning the application of res
udicata or collateral estoppel.

The court does not have to

onsider materials not in the record to make that determina\ on .

VMM NT IV

Till* STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE
OHRAN ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT
The

trial

court

properly

ecision on the Statute of Frauds

refused

to

(R. 251-254) .

base

its

An admis-

ion in pleadings, depositions, or in open court satisfies
he Statute of Frauds.

Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d

617

—

Utah 1984).

Defendants admitted that a contract existed.

Ohran admitted on page 528, lines 10-14 of the
rior

cases1

greed

to

transcript

pay

plaintiff

that Monte Vista's
a

6%

commission.

shareholder's
The

relevant

estimony came in as follows:
Q:
(By Mr. DeBry) The question was: "Tell me,
to the best of your recollection, what was
said during this conversation." And do you
recall at that time that you testified: "I
told Mr. Florence that we would agree to sell
the property to his buyers and to pay him a
six percent commission."
Was that your
testimony at this time we gave the deposition?
A:

(By Wallace Ohran) That was my
that is right. (R. 234-235).

testimony,

Defendants

assert

that

this

admission

is

not

sufficient because the term "we" allegedly does not identify
the promisors.

In context, however, it clearly refers to

Monte Vista and its former shareholders.

Moreover, it is

well established that ambiguities in the materials used to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds can be
evidence.

Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d

Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789
"Statute of Frauds" §296.
party.

resolved
134

(Mont. 19

by parol

(Utah

1945);

) ; 72 Am Jur.2d

This includes the identity of a

72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §297 n.45, n.46.
Defendants

further protest on the grounds that

plaintiff merely referred the court to the admission and did
not set it out fully for the trial court.

But defendants

themselves set the quote out fully in their own memorandum
to the trial court (R. 234-235) .
plaintiff's

citation

was

wrong

They did not assert that
or

argue

that

plaintiff

needed to do more to place the issue before the court.
(Id.).

The matter was presented to the trial court with

defendants' approval as to the form of submission.
cannot complain now.

They

Board of Education of Salt Lake City

v. Bothwell & Swanor, 400 P.2d 568 (Ut. 1965). l

Additionally, the contention that plaintiff
should have borne the burden of setting forth the actual
testimony is raised from the first time on appeal. Even if
there were merit to this argument, it should not be
considered for that reason alone. Edaar v. Waaner, 572 P.2d
405 (Utah 1977).
'
'

Defendants also ignore other writings and admissions.

Admittedly, the phrase in the Earnest Money Agree-

ment that makes Fitzgerald responsible to pay plaintiff's
commission (as between Monte Vista's former shareholders and
Fitzgerald)

does

not

commission.

Arguablyf

Richards

Hodson,

v.

specify

the

amount

of

plaintiff's

that could be supplied by
485

P.2d

1044

(Utah

1971);

custom.
Nev

v.

Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute
of Frauds" §297-.

At the minimum, the Earnest Money Agree-

ment (R. 152 and attached as Exhibit "C") together with the
Stock Sale Agreement

(R. 182-195), conclusively shows that

Monte Vista's former shareholders are the "we" referred to
in Ohran's admission.

The material necessary to satisfy the

Statute of Frauds need not be contained in one writing but
may be pieced together
Hess,

162 P.

70

from several sources.

(Utah

1916);

72 Am

Jur.2d

Fritsch v.
"Statute

of

Frauds" §371.
Ohran's actual deposition testimony referred to in
his in-court admission is attached as Exhibit E.
of the record (R. 81-87).

It is part

Using the term "we," Ohran admits

to an agreement to pay plaintiff a 6% commission on the sale
of the property

(R. 81) .

It is clear from the transcript

that the "we" refers to Monte Vista and its former shareholders.

(See, for example, R.84, lines 23 and 24; R. 85,

line 13, and the entire context of the admission).

THE STATUTE CF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS FULLY PERFORMED
Part performance generally satisfies the Statute
of Frauds. 73 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §405, et. seq.
Utah follows the general rule.
P.2d 282 (Utah 1942).
performed.

Greenwood v. Jackson, 128

In the present case, plaintiff fully

This is not just a part performance case.

Defendants rely heavily on Smith Realty Co. v.
Dioietro, 292 915 (Utah 1930) and Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 40
-

'

•*-

*

(Utah 1920) to support their conclusion that the doctrine of
part performance does not apply in situations where a real
estate broker seeks his commission when no written contract
for

that

commission

exists.

Both

Smith

Realty

Co. v.

Dioietro, supra and Case v. Ralph, supra were decided before
the Rules of Court Procedure were liberalized
notice pleading.

to permit

A close reading of both those cases shows

that they were each decided on the basis that the plaintiffs
did not adequately allege that any kind of a contract for a
commission existed.
Defendants also cite Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d
876 (Utah 1953) and Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772 (Utah 1921).
Neither of these cases actually held that full performance
does

not

satisfy

the

Statute

of

Frauds

in real

estate

commission cases.

Watson v. Odell, supra, held that the

real

could

estate

agent

not

recover

under

the

specific

wording of his contract where the underlying sale did not
occur.

Young v. Buchanan, supra held that an unlicensed

real estate agent could not use a licensed broker's license
when he was acting as an independent contractor rather than
an employee.

To be sure, the cases defendants cite hold

that a real estate commission cannot be recovered under a
quantum merit theory.

But they do not establish any rule

that full performance of an express contract cannot satisfy
the Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases.
To plaintiff's knowledge, the only Utah case which
has squarely decided whether full performance satisfies the
Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases is Kerr v.
Hillyard,

170 P.

981

(Utah

1918) .

That

case

performance would satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

held

full

Like Kerr

v. Hillyard, the pending case does not involve a situation
where the agent found a willing buyer but the sale did not
go through.

The contract was not just partly performed, it

was fully performed.

That satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
POINT VI

PLAINTIFF DID NOT ACT AS A
SECURITIES BROKER DEALER
The sale in this case was finally effected as a
sale of stock

(R. 182-195).

Thus, the Statute of Frauds

should not apply at all.
The
applies

argument

because

plaintiff

broker is without merit.
arrange

a

stock

selling property.

that

sale

the

was

Statute

not

a

of

Frauds

licensed

still

securities

First, plaintiff never intended to
(R.

152) .

He

always

felt he

was

He did not take part in changing the form

of the transaction and did not even learn that the form of
transaction had been changed until well after the Stock
Purchase Agreement had been executed (R. 197-19 8) .
Secondly, the transaction was an isolated one.
The Securities Laws in effect at that time defined a securities "broker-dealer" as a person "engaged in the business of
effecting

transactions

in securities

others or for his own account."
Annotated.

for the

account of

Section 61-1-13 Utah Code

Because the transaction was an isolated one

and

because plaintiff did not play a part in changing the form
of the deal, plaintiff was not "in the business" of dealing
in securities.

He was not a securities "broker-dealer" and

did not have to be licensed as such.
Yet the sale was consummated as a sale of stock
(R. 182-195).

Thus, the transaction does not fall within

the literal wording of the Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSION
The real issue in this case is not res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the Statute of Frauds.

The real

issue in this case is whether plaintiff intended to release
Monte Vista and its former shareholders from all liability
when he tried to secure payment from Fitzgerald.

That issue

is a fact question that has never been addressed.

The case

should be remanded for determination of that issue.
DATED this

^

day of January, 1986.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
By:

/<$/
DAVID M.
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5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

6

--000O000--

7
8

MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE,

11
12
13

Hi

<
u
«2

vs.

Defendants.

16

^? * o -

x/

§o§S

jfc ,P -B 0w

—oooOooo--

15

< < uI a

*

Civil No. 60784

MONTE VISTA RANCH, INC., a
Utah corporation, WALLACE
OHRAN, RAY E. NELSON, HOWARD
D. SHERWOOD, JOYCE T. RICE,
and NELDON WILLIAMS,

14
-

STATEMENT OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

9
10

yl

JOHN C. iiACKLUND
YOUNG, HACKLUND, KARRIS & CARTER
Attorneys for Defendants
350 East Center

COME NOW defendants, Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson, Howard D.
Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams, by and through their

18

attorney of record, and hereby submit this statement of points

19

and authorities in support of their Motion to Dismiss the complaint

20

on file herein.

flj<

z
o

3

>•

21

On or about June 1982, plaintiff in this matter filed a

22

complaint naming, among others, Wallace Ohran, Ray E. Nelson,

23

Howard D. Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams as defen-

24

dants.

25

Florence, a real estate agent for the plaintiff, prior to December

26

1977, allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the defendant

27

Wallace Ohran as President of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., a Utah

28

corporation, to pay a real estate commission to plaintiff of 6% in

29

the event that plaintiff could obtain a purchaser for the Monte

30

Vista Ranch.

31

severally and jointly, in the sum of $88,750.00 plus interest.

32

The complnint alsn eoniwiins /i

In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff maintains that Cal

Plaintiff seeks judgment against all defendants,

C;IUH»?

of action entitled Count II

1
2
3
4
5
6

based u p o n a claim s o u n d i n g in quantum m e r u i t .

p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r a t r a n s a c t i o n involving t h e sale of the M o n t e
V i s t a R a n c h and is entitled to b e compensated f o r the r e a s o n a b l e
v a l u e o f such time, energy a n d a s s e t s .
ARGUMENT

8

POINT I
P L A I N T I F F ' S CLAIM IS B A R R E D B Y T H E S T A T U T E OF FRAUDS OF T H E

9

S T A T E OF U T A H .

11

Utah Code A n n o t a t e d S e c t i o n 2 5 - 5 - 4 s t a t e s as f o l l o w s :

12

2 5 - 5 - 4 - - C e r t a i n A g r e e m e n t s Void Unless W r i t t e n and S u b s c r i b e d — I n the f o l l o w i n g cases, every a g r e e m e n t s h a l l b e
void u n l e s s such a g r e e m e n t , o r some n o t e or m e m o r a n d u m
t h e r e o f , is in w r i t i n g s u b s c r i b e d by the p a r t i e s to b e
ch n r g ed r h e row i t h :

13

9

14

5 Jg*-

15

It z ? S
< < u I a
QX >UJ *
5" Dt «*"*

z

0«

(5) Every a g r e e m e n t a u t h o r i z i n g or employing an agent or
b r o k e r to p u r c h a s e or sell r e a l estate for c o m p e n s a t i o n .

16
17

«
1h«

alleges

that its a g e n t , C a l F l o r e n c e , expended time, energy and a s s e t s in

7

10

Plaintiff

18
19
20

The a b o v e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e is clear a n d u n a m b i g u o u s .

U t a h S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e h a s imposed a r e q u i r e m e n t upon r e a l e s t a t e
b r o k e r s and a g e n t s to o b t a i n in w r i t i n g a n y a u t h o r i z a t i o n or
employment

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

a g r e e m e n t a u t h o r i z i n g o r e m p l o y i n g a n agent of b r o k e r

to p u r c h a s e or sell r e a l e s t a t e for c o m p e n s a t i o n .

21
22

The

In this m a t t e r , M o n t e V i s t a R a n c h , I n c . , b y and t h r o u g h
W a l l a c e O h r a n as P r e s i d e n t and H o w a r d S h e r w o o d a s S e c r e t a r y , o n or
about

December

7, 1977, entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and

Offer to Purchase with a potential purchaser of the property,
Leland A. Fitzgerald.

A copy of said Earnest Money Receipt and

Offer to Purchase is attached hereto and designated Exhibit "A".
Said agreement clearly provides on line 22 that:

"Buyer to be

responsible for all real estate commissions." The language of this
agreement is clear and unambiguous.

It cannot be argued in good

faith that by signing said agreement through its corporate
officers that Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. agreed to be responsible to

1
2

or pay a commission to Cal Florence, the real estate agent, or

3

the plaintiff therein as the real estate broker, a real estate

4

commission in connection with that transaction.

5
6

tiffs filed an action against Leland A. Fitzgerald as defendant in

7

the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,

8

State of Utah, Civil No. C-78-4944, making a claim in that action

9

that they were entitled to receive and recover a real estate

10

commission from Leland A. Fitzgerald.

11

after filed a third-party complaint against Wallace Ohran, Ray E.

12
X
111

13

<

14

5 £^ -

15

Leland A. Fitzgerald there-

Nelson, Howard D. Sherwood, Joyce T. Rice and Neldon Williams
alleging that he was entitled to recover from those third-party
defendants an amount equal to any judgment that would be entered
against him as defendant in the Salt Lake County matter.

The

matter was tried to a jury and plaintiffs in that matter failed to

C H5 *2
• > H r »s

recover judgment against the purchaser.
18

d
z

19

3
0

20

>

In fact, Mel Trimble Real Estate and Cal Florence as plain-

21
22
23
24
25

It is noteworthy that

plaintiff in this action failed to file a claim against Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc. or any of the other defendants in this matter
alleging that these defendants owed a real estate commission to
Mel Trimble Real Estate or Cal Florence.

Now, more than four

years later, plaintiff seeks to bring an action against these
defendants having lost in its previous action against Leland A.
Fitzgerald.
Certainly these defendants must be considered indispensable

26

parties to the prior action and plaintiff having failed to state a

27

cause of action against them or to have joined them as defendants

28

in the prior action has waived his right to bring a subsequent

29

action against them.

30

In conclusion on this point of the argument, these defendants

31

respectfully submit that plaintiff!s claim herein is barred by

32

failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds and further by failure

1
2

to join an indispensable party to the prior action.
POINT II

3
4
5
6

u

*s E J S *» < < wI «

A REAL ESTATE BROKER OR AGENT MAY ONLY RECOVER BY VIRTUE OF A
W R I T T E N C O N T R A C T AND CANNOT RECOVER ON A BASIS OF QUANTUM M E R U I T .
The Utah State Supreme Court held in the cases of W a t s o n v.

7

O d e l l , 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 7 7 2 , and Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 2 4 3 ,

8

188 P. 6 4 0 , cited with approval on the case of Young, et al v.

9

B u c h a n a n , 259 P.2d 876, that a broker or agent may recover only by

10

virtue of contract and cannot recover upon basis of quantum

11

meruit.

12

same p o i n t .

13

that a broker or agent cannot recover upon the basis of quantum

14

meruit and therefore Count II of the complaint should be dismissed.

The Court also cited with approval 20 ALR 280 for the
Tho Bjichnnan case* clearly stands for the proposition

CONCLUSION

15
16

Plaintiff in this m a t t e r has not satisfied the Statute of

_• > h t r*

5 z 2 o = 17

Frauds and Count I of the complaint should be dismissed.

* 0 co S
O t " K

18

tiff does not have a listing signed by any of the defendants

19

the above case authorizing or employing p l a i n t i f f or plaintiff's

20

a g e n t , Cal F l o r e n c e , to purchase or sell the M o n t e V i s t a Ranch for

21

compensation.

22

real estate broker or agent cannot recover upon the basis of

23

quantum meruit and Count II should be dismissed.

§<
6

z

3
0

Plainin

L

24

DATED this

W i t h respect to Count I I , Utah law is clear that a

day of J u l y , 1 9 8 2 .

25
26
27

T^v^
/JOHN C. BACKLUND
attorney for Defendants

28
29
30

I H E R E B Y CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
V a l d e n P. L i v i n g s t o n , Attorney for P l a i n t i f f , 965 East 4800 South,
Suite 2 , Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 7 , postage prepaid, this
IS**
day of J u l y , 1 9 8 2 .
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ROBERT J. DE BRY
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON
/attorneys for Plaintiffs
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 278-4439
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE r DilKD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTSt\ STATE OF UTAH
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE
and CAL FLORENCE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

'

LELAND A. FITZGERALD,

TRIAL BRIEF

Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. C 78-4944

vs.
WALLACE OKRAN, RAY E. NELSON,
HOWARD D. SHERWOOD, JOYCE T.
RICE.and NELDON WILLIAMS,

)

Third Party Defendants.)

INTRODUCTION
fl

(f

lit

"i i/J

Plaintiffs seek to recover from defendant pursuant to

{ y a thir
Lrd-party

beneficiary contract.

Plaintiffs believe that the

evidence will show that the contract was in writing.
the Statute of Frauds would not apply to this case.

As such,
However,

the defendant has pleaded that the contract is oral and therefore
subject to the Statute of Frauds.
Of necessity this brief must deal with both theories—
written or oral contract.

However, it may be useful to give

the court a "key" to show which issues relate to the written
contract theory, which issues relate to the oral contract theory,
and which issues overlap.
Written Contract Theory
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point

I
II
III
IV
V

Oral Contract Theory
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point

I
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Throughout this brief the plaintiffs will generally
be referred to as the broker, the defendant will generally
be referred to as the buyer, and the Monte Vista Ranch

Corp.

and its officers and directors will generally be referred to
as seller.

The following diagram will familiarize the court

with the relationships:

/
'

Seller
Third Party
Defendant

/
/

Euyer

' i
\

Defendant

\
/

A

Monte Vistax
Ranch Corp. \
(Wallace Ohran, Pres.)

/

Lcland
ritzgerald

/

\
/

Broker
Plaintiffs

Jlel Trimble Real Estate
(Cal Florence as agent)
A major portion of the brief will be devoted to
concepts of a third-party beneficiary contract.

Under that

theory, the relationships change somewhat and the following'
diagram may be helpful:

/'
^ Promisor agrees to
•pay $1,825^000
•directly to
/

/
Buyer
Fitzgerald

Seller
Monte Vista
Ranch, Inc.

promisee

/
y

Promisor
\

/

Promisee

/

\
/
\ Promisor aarees to pay
$125,000 directly to" beneficiary
/

Mel Trimble
Real Estate

'Beneficiary
FACTS
Although contested, the facts of this case are
relatively simply.
Some years ago broker entered into an oral arrangement
with Mr. Ohran to sell a ranch known as Monte Vista Ranch.
The seller was president of the corporation that owned the ranch.
The broker placed advertisements and showed the ranch
to a number of potential purchasers.

One day the buyer noticed

the advertisements and called broker.

They discussed the rar.ch

by telephone and went together for an inspection of the property.
After some protracted negotiations, buyer, seller
and broker met at Gene Fullmer's restaurant to finalize their
deal.

At that time seller quoted a sales price of $2,000,000.

However, seller said he would reduce that price to $1,97 5,000
on the condition that buyer would pay a commission of $125,000
directly to the broker.

Everyone agreed.

Thereafter the parties met at an accountant's
office in American Fork.

The arrangement was reduced to a

standard Earnest Money Contract which was executed by both
buyer and seller.

That Earnest Money Contract is attached

hereto as Exhibit "A".
The Earnest Money Contract specifically provides
that:

"Buyer to be responsible for all commissions."
The *nl Try'^g day buyer gave broker a $5,000

payment toward the commission.

Thereafter, buyer and seller

met separately and made some minor changes in their arrangement.
The primary change had to do with tax planning.

Instead of

conveying just the ranch, seller conveyed the entire corporation
to buyer.
ranch.

However, the sole asset of the corporation was the

The final Stock Sale Agreement between buyer •ajid seller

is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
Broker has made repeated demands for buyer to pay
the balance of the commission.

Buyer has refused to pay any

further commission.
Broker filed this lawsuit to enforce a third-party
beneficiary contract under which the buyer was obligated to
pay a $125,000 commission as part of the purchase price.

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE THE BENEFICIARIES
OF A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT WHICH THEY *1AY ENFORCE
In this action, seller orally promised to pay broker
a commission if he found a purchaser for the ?4onte Vista Ranch.
Pursuant to that arrangement, broker found a buyer. Hov:ever,
seller's obligation was subject to the defense of the Statute
of Frauds because his promise was oral.

Utah Code Ann.

S 25-5-4(5).
In the final negotiations, seller transferred his
obligation to pay a commission to buyer.

Seller had originally

agreed to sell the ranch for $2,000,000 and to pay broker his
6% commission.

After some negotiations, the purchase price

was lowered from $2,000,000 to $1,875,000 on the condition
that buyer would pay broker a commission of $12 5,000.
When two parties enter into a contract with the
intent to benefit a third party, a third-party beneficiary
contract is formed which the beneficiary may enforce.

See, e.c.,

Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215,
341 P.2d 944 (1959); Fisk v. Stevens, 33 P. 248 (Utah 1893);
Moran v. Audette, 217 A.2d 653 (D.C.Cir. 1966); Continental
Bank and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955).;
4 Corbin on Contracts §§ 821-22.
The early Utah case of Brown v. Markland, 52 P. 597
(Utah 1898) demonstrates the principle of a third-party
beneficiary contract.

In that case defendant purchased a mine.

As part of the purchase contract, defendant agreed to pay certain
"claims of persons who have performed labor upon or furnished
material" to the mine. , Plaintiff had performed labor on the mine
and sued for payment.

Defendant refused to pay.

The Utah Supreme

Court held that the plaintiff was a beneficiary to the thirdparty -beneficiary contract between the purchaser and seller of

the nine and as such could enforce his claim:
The contract thus made, for a valuable
consideration, inured to her benefit,
and the grantee of the premises became
the promisor. She thereafter had a right
to look to him for payment of her claim,
under the rule that 'where a promise or
contract has been made between two parties
for the benefit of a third, an action will
lie thereon at the instance and in the
name of the party to be benefited, although
the promise or contract was made without
his knowledge, and without any consideration moving from him,' [Citations omitted.]
52 P. 597 at 599.
The case

most exactly on point is Peter's Grazinc Ass'n'.

v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1976).

In that case the seller

of a ranch had agreed to pay a real estate commission.

During

the negotiations for the purchase of the ranch, the sales price
was lowered from $2,060,000 to $2,030,000 on the condition that
the buyer would pay the real estate commission of $30,000.
The buyer agreed and purchased the ranch, but he refused to pay
the commission.

The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the real

estate agent was a beneficiary of a third-party beneficiary contract and the buyer was ordered to pay the commission:
In examination of all the circumstances,
we repeat what has previously been inferred.
This was a contract arrangement whereby the
defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a broker's
commission, owed to plaintiff by the Peters
estate, under a settlement agreement between*
the plaintiff and the executor. The amount
of the consideration agreed to be paid for
the ranch took this into account. What
actually exists contractually is a third
party beneficiary contract. It was not
necessary that plaintiff perform any services for the defendant.
It is a well settled rule of law that
where one person agrees with another, on
a sufficient consideration, to do a thing
for the benefit of a third person, the third
person may enforce the agreement, and it is
not necessary that any consideration move
from the latter. It is enough if there is
a sufficient consideration between the parties
who made the contract.
*

•

+

It would be inequitable to permit defendant to
avoid payment of plaintiff's claim. It
would result in a windfall to that organization and amount to unjust enrichment. Its

offer for the ranch was $2,060,000.00.
The lesser price of $2,030,000.00 was
agreed upon solely for the purpose of
shifting the obligation of payment to
the defendant. There is a lack of any
suggestion in the record of any offer
to pay the Peters estate the $30,000.00
by which the sale price was reduced.
It would unjustly gain not only at the
expense of the plaintiff but at the
expense of the Peters estate as well.
As noted, when we slash through th
underbrush, we find that the $30,000.00
was actually part of the consideration
for the ranch ....
544 P.2d at 457-58.
POINT II
THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT WAS REDUCED TO WRITING,
AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS
THEREFORE INAPPLICABLE
The parties discussed their oral arrangement in
detail.

However, it is not necessary for the broker to rely on

any oral conversation or oral contract.

On December 7, 1977

the arrangement was reduced to writing in the form of a standard
Earnest Money Contract (Exhibit "A").

That writing is sufficient

within its four corners to constitute a complete contract
between the parties.
The seller has raised the affirmative defense of
Statute of Frauds.

That statute states in part:

In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement ...
is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
Since the Earnest Money Agreement is in writing,
it is by definition outside the Statute of Frauds.
Buyer's only conceivable argument is that the written
Earnest Money Agreement is somehow incomplete.

That is to say

it doesn't contain all of the terms between the parties.
Therefore, it is arguably a non contract.

If the Earnest

Money Agreement is a non contract, broker would be forced to
rely on some oral contract to establish liability.

However, the terms of th- Earnest Money Agreement

are spelled

out in great detail.

broker subnits

that

the

Earnest Money Agreement is a complete written third-party
beneficiary contract which can be enforced by the beneficiary.
To begin with, note what is included in the
agreement:
1.

Date;

2.

Where the contract was made;

3.

Name of the buyer;

4.

Name of the seller;

5.

The amount of earnest money deposit;

6.

The form of earnest money deposit;

7.

Description of the land to be sold;

8.

Description of the equipment to be

included

in the sale;
9.

The total purchase price;

10.

The total down payment;

11.

The terms for handling the installment contract;

12.

Lot release provisions;

13.

Arrangement for pro-rating the taxes;

14.

Possession date;

15.

Date of closing;

16.

Provision for conveyance of title and
title insurance;

17.

Provision for liquidated damages;

18.

Provision for attorney fees;

19.

Provision for the buyer to pay real estate
commissions;

20.

Signature of the parties.

Admittedly, some matters are not spelled out in detail.
For example, the document does not spell out who will get the
real estate commission; nor does the document set the amount of

the real estate commission.
However, such details hardly make the Earnest Money
Agreement a non contract.

Indeed, there is probably not a

contract in existence that spells out all details.
See, e.g., Blackhawk Heat & P. Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp. ,
302 S.2d 404,

408-9 (Tla. 1974):

Even though all the details are not
definitely fixed, an agreement may be
binding if the parties agree on the
essential terms and seriously understand
and intend the agreement to be binding
on them. A subsequent difference as to
the construction of the contract does
not affect the validity of the contract
or indicate the minds of the parties did
not meet with respect thereto.
The contract should not be held void
for uncertainty unless there is no other
way out. As was stated by Justice
Cardczo
in Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M. Lurie
Woolen Co. , Inc., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N\E.
370, 371, 'Indefiniteness must reach the
point where construction becomes futile.'
Again turning to Professor Corbin, he
states at § 95, page 400:
'If the parties have concluded a
transaction in which it appears they
intend to make a contract, the court
should not frustrate their intention
if it is possible to reach a fair and
just result, even though this requires
a choice among conflictinq meanings and
filling of some gaps that the parties
have left.'
Professor Corbin again states at
§ 95/ page 396:
'In considering expressions of agreement, the court must not hold the parties
to some impossible,
or iaesl,
or unusual
standard. It must take language as it is
and people as they are. All agreements
have some degree of indefiniteness and
some degree of uncertainty.'

See also:

J.W. Knapo Co. v. Sinas, 172 N.W.2d 867 (Mich.ADD.
1969);
S. Jun Kreedman & Co. v. Mover Bros. , 130 Cal.Rptr. 41
(Cal.App. 1976).

True, the broker's name was not included.

However,

that matter may be supplied by the doctrine of practical
construction:
Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous
and the parties place their own construction
on their agreement and so perform, the court
may consider this as persuasive evidence
of what their true intention was. The
parties, by their action and performance,
have demonstrated what was their meaning
and intent; the contract should be enforced
by the courts.
534 P.2d at 90.
See also: Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v, Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266;
Bullough v. Simons, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308;
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 275.
Everyone knew who the broker was.

Indeed, the day

following the execution of the Earnest Money Agreement, buyer
delivered $5,000 to broker toward the commission.

As a matter

of practical construction, the parties clearly knew and intended
that Mel Trimble Real Estate was the person who should receive
the real estate commission.
It is further true that the written contract does not
state the amount of the commission.
to find a non contract.

Again, that is no reason

The recent case of Ferris v. Jennings,

595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) is squarely in point.

In that case

defendant (and counter-claimant) sought to enforce an oral
purchase agreement.

Defendant contended that there was no binding

contract because the amount of the commission was specified—
"a fair commission."

The court ruled that the failure to specify

an exact amount for commissions did not defeat the contract.
A contract is not fatally defective
as to price if their is an agreement
as to some formulae or method for
fixing it.
* * *
Where the transaction with respect to
the main subject matter of a contract
is definite, an agreement for fixing

reasonable compensation lor some
adjunctive service in connection
therewith does not render the contract
so indefinite as to be unenforceable.
595 P.2d at 859.
The court may let in parol evidence to assist in the
interpretation and construction of the Earnest Money Agreement.
However, it is important to note that such parol evidence would
come in as ctn aid in interpreting an existing written contract.
The parol evidence does not come in to establish an independent
oral contract.
The Utah Statute of Frauds covers situations where
the existence of a contract must be proven by parol evidence.
The statute is not intended to cover every circumstance where
parol evidence is used to help interpret an existing written
contract.
POINT III
THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT CANNOT BE ABROGATED
OR RESCINDED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS
HAVE ACCEPTED IT AND ACTED UPON IT
Broker claims a commission under the terms of the
Earnest Money Contract (or at least under the terms of some
companion oral contract).

However, buyer contends that the

Earnest Money Contract somehow expired or was abrogated.
Defendant contends that buyer and seller executed a Stock Sale
Agreement some months later that did not include any provision
for a real estate commission.

Seller contends that broker's

claim for a commission died when the Earnest Money Contract
was cancelled.
However, even if the parties made a new contract,
the court should not allow seller to escape payment of a
commission.

Seller agreed to pay that real estate commission

under a third-party beneficiary contract.

Where the beneficiary

to such an agreement accepts, adopts, or acts upon the agreement,
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the promisor and promisee cannot rescind or modify it without
his consent so as to deprive him of his rights unless they
have specifically reserved the right to do so.
Plunkett v. Atkins, 371 P.2d 727 (Okla. 19G2);
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 266 S.W.2d 790 (Ky.Ct.App. 1953);
Pitzer v. Wedel, 165 P.2d 971 (Cal.App. 1946);
Oman v, Yates, 422 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1967);
Restatement of Contracts § 14 2;
4 Corbin on Contracts § 815 at 256.
The rule is correctly stated in Oman as follows:
It is undoubtedly true that once
a contract has been completely formed
for the benefit of a third party the
promisor and promisee may not get
together and mutually rescind, unless
the contract, by its terms, reserves
the right so to do; nor may the
promisee (Rheims) unilaterailv revoke.
422 P.2d 495.
In addition, Corbin has stated:
In a much greater number of cases,
however, it has been definitely held
that the promisor and the promisee
can rescind their contract at any time
before the creditor beneficiary has
"assented" or "accepted" or acted in
reliance upon the contract.
No general statement has been agreed
upon by the courts as to the exact moment
when the promisee first loses his power
to disch rge* There seems to be no doubt
that such power is lost as soon as the
beneficiary has begun to act in reliance
upon the contract; and the rule is
generally stated to the effect that the
power of discharge is gone as soon as
the third party has expressed his assent.
(Emphasis added.)
* 4 Corbin on Contracts
§ S15 at
256-5S.
The case of Rhodes v. Rhodes, supra, illustrates the
point that once the third party accepts, adopts or acts upon
the contract, the parties thereto cannot rescind or modify it
to deprive the third party of his rights thereunder.
case, Rhodes entered into an employment contract.

In that

Among other

things, the contract stated that if Rhodes died before reaching
age 65, annuity payments would be made to his infant son.
years later Rhodes divorced his wife and remarried.

Several

The employ-

ment contract was rescinded and a new one entered into with the
same company.

Several changes were made in the terms, including

the substitution of his new wife as the beneficiary of the
annuity payments rather than his son.

The Kentucky Court of

Appeals held that the son was a beneficiary to a third-party
beneficiary contract which could not be rescinded because he
had accepted it prior to the substitution of Rhodes' new wife
therein.
In this case broker was present when buyer agreed
to purchase the ranch for $1,875,000 plus payment of $125,000
commission to the broker.

In fact, the broker helped negotiate

that agreement and even brought the parties together.
never objected to it.

Broker

He accepted it as the manner in which

he would be paid and he looked to buyer for payment.

Shortly

after the agreement was made, broker accepted $5,000 from the
buyer as part payment of the third-party beneficiary obligation.
Any rescission or modification of that agreement by buyer and
seller occurred several weeks after the agreement was reached
and several weeks after the $5,000 payment was made.

It is

apparent that broker accepted, adopted and acted in reliance
upon the third-party beneficiary contract prior to the time
of any rescission or modification thereto.

As such, any

rescission or modification cannot be used by seller or buyer
to prevent broker from collecting his commission.
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POINT IV
THE PROMISOR OF A THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT MUST PAY
THE BENEFICIARY EVEN IF THE
PROMISSEE HAD NO OBLIGATION'
TO THE BENEFICIAL
Po^ the sake of clarity, we repeat here the scenario.
Seller orally promised to pay a 6% commission to broker.

That

original par°l agreement would have fallen squarely under the
statute of frauds (Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5)). Thus, we might
assume arguendo that the original contract between seller
and broker was unenforceable.

However, at a later time the

seller made a new oral agreement directly with the buyer.

Under

that oral aqreement, buyer promised to purchase the ranch by
delivering $1,875,000 directly to seller and $125,000 to the
broker.
Tn£ buyer now seeks to avoid payment of that $125,000.
Buyer contends that the seller had no obligation to pay a
commission ifl the first place because of the statute of frauds.
The buyer argues that he should not be obligated to pay a debt
which never e^ist^fc ox VnicYi vas barrel b^ Vne ^tavat^ of ira^s*
However, it is completely immaterial whether or not seller was
originally obligated to pay the $125,000 to the broker.

The

buyer is not entitled to the benefit of defenses which /night
have originally existed between the seller and the broker.
This principle is explained in Peters Grazing Ass'n
v. Legerski, 544 P.2d.449 (Wyo. 1976) as follows:
Where the promisor agrees to pay
a 5um of money to a third party, to whom
th£ promisee says he is indebted, it is
immaterial whether the promisee is
actually indebted to that amount at all,
and defenses which promisee might have
had available against third party are
noC available to the promisor.
544 P.2d at 458.
See also:

4 Corbin on Contracts § 821-22.
It is also illustrated by two cases, McKay v. Ward,

20 Utah 149, 57 P. 1024 (1899) and Lane v. Davis, 342 P. 267
<vC^l.kpp. 186>9\»

Itv *\cKay > the. hviyer of a. niece, of real estate.>

as part of the purchase price, promised the seller to pay thenortgage thereon held by the bank.

The seller had purchased

the real estate from a third person taking it subject to the
same mortgage.

The seller had never agreed to pay the mortgage,

being subject only to a foreclosure sale of the property if he
did not.

When the buyer failed to pay the mortgage, the bank

foreclosed and sued the buyer for the deficiency.

The bank

sued for the deficiency as a third-party beneficiary to the
contract for the purchase of the real estate.

The issue in the

case was whether a third-party beneficiary could collect from
the promisee under a third-party beneficiary contract when
the promisor was himself not obligated to the beneficiary.
The Utah Supreme Court held that the promisee still had to pay
the mortgage even if the promisee vas not obligated to do so:
Utah, and some other states, hold that
a purchaser is liable on his assumption
and agreement to pay the mortgage,
although the agreement to assume and
pay it be in a deed from a grantor who
was under no personal liability to pay
the mortgage. In these states it is
held that the price of the land is a
sufficient consideration for the agree^
ment to pay the mortgage debt, and that,
where the amount of the mortgage is
withheld for the purpose of satisfying
the obligation, a vendor may rightfully
direct how, when and to whom the purchase
price of property he sells may be paid?
that he may rightfully receive it to higl~
self, donate it to public charity, or
make such other disposition of it as
may best meet his views; that where a
promise or contract has been made between
two parties,for the benefit of a third,
action will lie thereon at the instance
of the third party to be benefited,
although the promise, or contract vas
made without the knowledge of the third
party, and without any consideration
moving direct from him; that, if the
vendee agrees to pay in accordance
with such directions of the vendor,
he cannot set up as a defense that
his vendor was under no dutv to acoiv
and pay the fund in the manner agreea.
(Emphasis added.)
57 P. at 1025

In Lane v. Davis, supra, a real estate broker was
orally engaged to sell real property for a 5% commission.

The

broker found a buyer who eventually purchased the property.
The escrow agreement stated that the broker was to get one-half
of. the commission and the other one-half was to go to another
person.

The court held that the oral agreement was invalid

under the statute of frauds but that the broker should be
allowed to amend the complaint to state a claim as a beneficiary
to the escrow agreement which was a third-party beneficiary
contract.
If the promisor places no conditions on his promise,
then it matters not what defenses are available to the promisee
against the beneficiary.

Of course, the promisor may promise

to pay the beneficiary only if the third party's claims against
the promisee are enforceable and not subject to some defense,
such as the statute of frauds.

This principle is explained by

Corbin:
There is nothing to prevent a promisor
from undertaking a larger duty than the
duty owed by the promisee to the beneficiary.
He can make his own promise unconditional,
although the duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary is conditional upon an uncertain
event." If he promises to pay a third party
a sum claimed by him against the promisee,
irrespective of defenses that the promisee
may have, he is bound by his promise in the
teeth of those defenses, so long as the
contract does not run afoul of some principle
of public policy. Promises of this sort
are often made? a grantee from a mortgagor
who assures, the debt usually cannot question
the validity of the mortgage or the debt
that he promises to pay.

A promise may be void for illegality or
lack of sufficient consideration. It may
be voidable because of infancy, fraud, or
duress. It may be unenforceable by reason
of the statute of limitations, discharge
in bankruptcy, or non-compliance with the
statute of fraudSo This is not intended
to be a list including all such possible
cases. As in the preceding section, so
here the promisee may contract for either
a conditional or an unconditional oromise.

If it is the latter, the facts that would
operate as a defense to the promisee when
sued by the third party will not so operate
when the promisor is sued. (Emphasis added.)
4 Corbin on Contracts, £§ 821-22.
See also:

Williston on Contracts, S 361 and Restatement of

Contracts, § 131 (l)(b).
In this case buyer placed no conditions on his
promise.

He agreed to pay all real estate commissions.

{Ea

Money /agreement, line 22, attached hereto as Exhibit "A".)
statute of frauds is, therefore, not available to him as a
defense.

He should be compelled to pay the commission.

POINT V
THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT PURCHASED
STOCK RATHER THAN LAND DOES NOT
AVOID HIS OBLIGATIOrJ TO PAY A
COMMISSION UNDER THE THIRDPARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT
Where a broker is engaged to sell the assets of a
corporation for a commission, he is entitled to a commission
where the final sale is one of stock rather than assets.

This

is so because the sale of all of the corporation's stock is in
substance and effect a sale of the assets.

The buyer gets

what he is after—control of the corporate assets.

Feldman v.

Fiat Estates, Inc. , 268 N.Y.S.2d 949, 25 App.Div.2d 750 (19-66);
Morad v. Haddad, 110 N.E.2d 364 {Mass. 1953); Rubin v. M.S.W.
Hotels, Inc., 89 N.Y.S.2d 241, 275 Anp.Div. 829 (1949).
As stated in Morad:
The transfer of stock by Kaddad
effected the sale of the corporate
property for which Morad had been
employed to find a customer. The corporation was owned by Haddad. It was
used by him as an agency through which
he conducted business. The sale of
all of the stock of the corporation
was in legal effect a sale of all of
its assets, and the mere fact that
the parties found it more convenient
to transfer all of the stock rather
than to make a conveyance of its assets
does not change the substance of the
transaction. Benedict v. Dakin,
243 111. 384, 388, 90 N.E. 712. See
Seward v. M. Seward & Son Co., 91 Conn.
190, 99 A. 887; Mills v. Miller, W.Va.
64 S.Ec2d 111. Morad was entitled to
the same commission which he would have
earned had the corporate property been
directly conveved. (Emphasis added.)
110 N.E. 2d'at 367-.
POINT VI
EVEN IF THE CONTRACT WAS ORAL,
IT WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS' SECTION ON
BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS
The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part:
Certain agreements void unless
written and subscribed. - In the following cases every agreement shall be void

unless such agreement, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith: ...
(5) Every agreement authorising
or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 2 5-5-4.
At one time the broker had an oral contract to sell
the ranch on behalf of the owner.

Of course, that parol

contract would fall squarely under § 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Ann.
quote above.

However, the parties later changed their arrange-

ment to a third-party beneficiary contract.

Specifically,

seller entered into a direct and independent contract with
the buyer.

In that contract the seller agreed to reduce the

purchase price from $2,000,000 to $1,875,000 on the condition
that the seller would pay the real estate commission of
$125,000.
This new arrangement was a classic third-party
beneficiary contract.
is the promisee.

Buyer is the promisor and the seller

The broker is the beneficiary.

The nature

of the contract is simply an arrangement between buyer and
seller on the method or mechanics of handling the payment.
In other words, seller says in substance:
I have a ranch worth $2,000,000. I will
sell it to you if you will give $1,875,000
directly to me and $125,000 directly to
the'beneficiary (broker) designated by me.
In response, the buyer agrees in substance that:
I acree to purchase your ranch for
$2,000,000/
I will deliver
$2,575,000
to you and I will deliver $125,000 to
the beneficiary (broker) designated
by you.
It is obvious on its face that this is not "an agreement ... employing a broker to purchase or sell . .. . " Utah Code
Ann. § 25-5-4(5).

Here no one is asking, telling, or expecting

the broker to sell or purchase anything.
has no duties.

Indeed, the broker

For the purposes of the third-party beneficiary

contract, the broker is a passive bystander.

The legislature could have covered this type of
arrangement under the Statute of Trauds.

It chose not to do so.

The court should not expand the coveranc of the statute by
judicial legislation.
POINT VII
EVEN IF THE THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT WAS
ORAL, IT COULD NOT FALL UNDER
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS' SECTION
REGARDING THE "DEBT, DEFAULT
OR MISCARRIAGE OF ANOTHER"
The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part:
Certain agreements void unless written
and subscribed.
In the following cases
every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith:
(a) Every promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4.
Here the buyer agreed to pay a commission, thereby
relieving the seller of that burden.

However, that promise

does not fall within the language of the statute.
As a part of the purchase price, buyer agreed to pay
$1,875,000 to the seller and $125,000 to the broker.

Thus,

when the buyer pays $125,000 to the broker he is not paying
another person's debt.

He is paying his own debt.

The doctrine

is explained by Professor williston:
In other words, although a promise is
in form one to pay the debt of another
and the performance thereof may incidentally
have the effect of extinguishing the
liability of another, if the main purpose
and object in making the promise is not to
answer for another, but directly to sub*
serve the interest of the promisor, the
promise is not within the Statute. The
theory underlying these decisions is that
if the promisor is himself acquiring property
or other pecuniary benefit, he is engaging
not to pay the debt of another, but his
own.
* * *

If, as between himself and the
original promisor, the debt really
ought to be paid by the latter, whatever may be the other elements of the
transaction, the new promisor is on
principle and in fact promising to
answer for the debt or default of
another. Though he is led to do
this by considerations of his own
advantage, the ultimate fact that
the debt is anothers is none the less
true. On the other hand, if, as
between the original debtor and the
new promisor, the latter ought to pay
the debt, he is promising to answer
for his own debt, not that of another.
Williston on Contracts § 472 at 432 and 448.
The case of Gunnison v. Kaufman, 72 N.W.2d 70 6 (V?isc.
1955) is illustrative.

In that case, a corporation was sold.

As part of the purchase, the buyers promised to assume certain
debts of the corporation.
the debts.

Thereafter the buyers refused to pay

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held:

With respect to the application of the
statute of frauds: The alleged promise
which Kaufman made to get Gunnison 'off
the hook' and personally take care of the
two obligations at the Reedsburg Bank was
not a promise to answer for the debts of
Gunnison to the bank. It was a promise
made as part of a purchase deal in which
Kaufman, the purchaser, and Gunnison, the
seller, agreed that Kaufman's undertaking
to pay those existing obligations was to be
part of the purchase price for the property
he (Kaufman) received. In other words,
the promise merely specified the method
by which the promisor (Kaufman) was to
pay off his own obligations to the
promisee (Gunnison) for the transfer of
the corporation property to him (?;aufman).
The statute of frauds clearly does not
apply to such a situation.
72 N.W.-2G 710.
See also:

Campbell v. Hickory farms of Ohio, 190 S.E.2d 26

(S.C. 1972)? cf. Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477
(1897).
Therefore, the Statute of Frauds provision regarding
"debts of another" is not applicable.
to pay the 6% commission.

Here the buyer promised

He is being asked to pay his own

debts—not the debts of another.

POIKT

VII

EVEN IF THE THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACT WAS ORAL,
THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT OF
DECEMBER 7, 1977, IS A SUFFICIENT
MEMO TO TAKE THE PROMISE OUTSIDE
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Broker seeks to enforce an agreement under which
buyer promised to pay a commission of $125,000.

If that

contract was oral — it would be void unless there was a
"written note or memorandum thereof."

Section 25-5-4(5) of

the Utah Code states:

In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement
or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:

(5) Every agreement authorizing
or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for
compensation. (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs rely upon the Earnest Money Agreement of
December 7, 1977, as a sufficient memorandum to take the oral
agreement outside the statute of frauds.

That Earnest Money

Agreement will be submitted as an exhibit at the trial and is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

—
Plaintiffs argue elsewhere in this brief that the promise was
not oral at all. It was in writing (Earnest Money Agreement)
and, therefore, not subject to the statute of frauds.
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A.

Difference Between an Oral Contract and a Memorandum or
Note Evidencing the Oral Contract.
In analyzing this issue, it is important to note that

there is a difference between the oral contract and the written
memorandum:
The difference between a contract in
writing and a memorandum of a parol
contract is important .... The memorandum need not itself constitute a
contract, and apart from its effect as
a memorandum, it need have no legal
operation. There must be a valid
oral contract, however, of which the
memorandum is an accurate statement.
'Except as evidence of the oral contract,
the memorandum has no force or effect
unless and until the oral contract
has been established by a preponderance
of the evidence. Then if accurate and
complete, it prevents the interposition
of the statute of frauds as a bar to the
enforcement of the oral contract. The
memorandum, however, need not be made
with that intent.
Williston on Contracts § 567A.
The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit "A") is in
writing and is subscribed to by defendant Fitzgerald.

The

only issue remaining is whether the Earnest Money Agreement is
a "sufficient" memorandum to take the oral agreement beyond
the statute of frauds.
B.

Philosophy and Purpose of the Statute.
Any analysis of this issue must begin with a look

at the history and purpose of the statute of frauds:
An effective aid in arriving at the
requisites and meaning of 'a note or
memorandum in writing' is an enlightened
awareness of the origin and fundamental
purpose of the Statute of Frauds.
Preoccupied with numerous and oft conflicting precepts and decisions involving
the clauses provided for a note or memorandum, -some students of the Statute fail
to see the beacon for the buoys.
The Statute of Frauds was not enacted
to afford persons a means of evading lust
obligations; nor was it intended to supply
a cloajc of immunity to hedging litigants
lacking integrity; nor was it adoptea~to
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enable defendants to interpose the Statute
as a bar to a contract fairly, and
admittedly, made.

In brief, the Statute 'was intended to
guard against the perils of perjury and
error in the spoken word. Therefore, if
after a consideration of the surrounding
circumstances, the pertinent facts and all
the evidence in a particular case, the
court concludes that enforcement of the
agreement will not subject the defendant
to fraudulent claims, the purpose of the
Statute will best be served by holding
the note or memorandum sufficient even
though it by ambigucTus or incomplete.
Williston on Contracts § 567A.
C.

Parol Evidence Admissible to Show Surrounding Circumstances.
The landmark case in Utah on this issue is Hawaiian

Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (Utah 1949).

In

that case plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement for the purchase of surplus war equipment.
raised the statute of frauds as a defense.

Defendant

The only "memorandum"

of the oral agreement was a telegram which stated:
Hawaiian Equipment, Honolulu
"Reference hammers bid maximum
24 dollars each scalers 17.50
each Honolulu will take all
"Eimco"
The issue on appeal was whether the foregoing (admittedly vague)
cable was a "sufficient" memorandum to rake the matter outside
the statute of frauds.
The court first set forth the guidelines for its
analysis.

The court"quoted with approval the following language

from Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 207, which states:
'A memorandum, in order to make
enforceable a contract within the
Statute, may be any document or
writing, formal or informal, signed
by the party to be charged or by his
agent actually or apparently authorized
thereunto, which states wirh reasonable
certainty,
1
(a) each party to the contract either
by his own name,or by such a description
as will serve to identify him, or by the
name or description of his agent, and

*(b) the land, goods, or other
subject-matter to which the contract
relates, and
%
(c) the terms and conditions
of all
the promises constituting the contract
and by whom and to whom the promises are
made.

'Comment:
'a. A written memorandum of a
contract is not identical with a written
contract. A written contract will indeed
serve as a memorandum, but a memorandum
includes also any writing which states
the terms agreed upon, though not intended
or adopted by the parties as a final
complete statement of their agreement.
The degree of particularity with which
the terms of the contract, the names or
descriptions of the parties must be set
out cannot be reduced to an exact formula.
There must be 'reasonable' certainty and
there must be accuracy, but the possibility
need not be excluded that some other subjectmatter or person than those intended will
also fall within the words of the writing.1
The court then quoted that the bare words of the cabl^
were incomplete and contained any number of ambiguities.
However, the court resolved the ambiguities by resort to parol
evidence,

The court said;
The principle that the goods must be
identified and the other terms and conditions set forth with reasonable certainty,
must be considered in connection with the
knowledge and relationship of the parties
and trade usages to determine whether the
contents of the memorandum sufficiently
conveyed to the parties involved an identity
of the subject-matter and a reasonable
certainty of the other terms and conditions.
While the use of abbreviated phrases
may render -the writing unintelligible to
an uninstructed person, the phrase may
still have meaning when viewed in the
light of circumstances surrounding the
sending of the cablegram. When this court
scrutinizes the language of the cablegram,
it gives to the words'used the meaning
ascribed to them by merchants who are
familiar with their usage and have occasion
to deal with them in the commercial world.
Ifr by giving the words such meaning, the
subject-matter is intelligently identified
and the terms and conditions are fairiv
disclosed, then parol evidence is admissible
for a limited purpose. While this type 01
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evidence is not competent to contradict or vary the terms of a memorandum
to show what is intended, the situation
of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at the time the contract was
made may be shown by such proof to apply
the memorandum to the subject matter.
The cablegram is not so lacking in details
as to amount to a nullity and when it is
interpreted in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, any deficiencies
are supplied and the instrument then becomes
certain in all of its terms. The conditions
are not changed or modified; they are
explained ....
207 P.2d at 797-98.
The doctrine of permitting parol evidence to explain
or clarify the written memorandum was again followed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d
196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969).

In that case plaintiff sought to

enforce a contract to recover for services rendered.

Defendant

(among other defenses) raised the Statute of Frauds.

The only

"writing" in the case was a letter from defendants to plaintiff
which set forth some, but not all of the conditions of the
alleged contract.
In analyzing the issue the court concluded that
parol evidence would be permitted:
Inasmuch as the letter was silent on an
important aspect of the agreement, that
is, what if anything the defendants
received for what they granted, the only
fair and sensible thing to be done was
what the trial court did: Admit other
evidence to show what the arrangement
between the parties was. This was
necessary to get at the justice of the
case, whether the letter in question
amounted to a binding obligation ...
or even if it did not ....
450 P.2d at 469.
As stated in Stanchack v. Cliffside Park Ko. 1527 L.O.M. Inc.,
282 A.2d 775, 779 (N.J.App. 1971):
[Tjthe writing need not expressly use
the language of authorization [of a
broker]
In determining whether such implication
is warranted from the words used in

the writing, however, it is permissible,
and sometimes, as here essential to
scrutinize the surrounding circumstances.
Brookes v, Adolph's, 339 P.2d 879
Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789
D.

The Earnest Money Agreement Confirms the Existence of
a Separate Oral Contract.
Based upon the foregoing principles, we now turn

to an analysis of the December 7, 1977 Earnest Money Agreement.
To begin with, it was executed by the buyer--"the party to
be charged."

Thus, that portion of the statute is clearly

satisfied.
We turn now to the phrase:
for all real estate commission."

"Buyer to be responsible

Note that the contract could

have, but did not say, "Buyer to be responsible for all real
estate commissions, if any."

Thus, the writing clearly confirms

an existing obligation to pay real estate commissions.

The

writing does not say what duties the real estate agent had to
perform in order to receive the commission.
not necessary.

However, that is

The parties obviously knew and agreed what

duties the agent would have.

Further, the parties obviously

knew and agreed that the duties had all been satisfied., The
Earnest Money Agreement acknowledged that the broker's duties
were satisfactorily provided and that payment was now due.
In other words, the Earnest Money Agreement serves as a written
memorandum that the broker orally agreed to undertake the certain
duties and tht he had satisfactorily performed those duties.
E.

The Earnest Money Agreement Confirms that Buyer Vias one
Party to the Oral Contract.
We know at least one of the parties to that oral

agreement.

We know from the writing that the buyer will pay

the real estate commissions.

F.

The Earnest Money Agreement with Surrounding Circumstances
Confirms the Amount of the Commission.
At first blush it is not apparent from the Earnest

Money Agreement how much money defendant agreed to pay as a
real estate commission.

However, with the aid of parol evidence,

the agreement does contain sufficient information to establish
the amount of the commission.
Note that the contract says that the buyer is to be
responsible for "all real estate commission

We are told by

Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 207 P.2d 794 (Utah 1949)
that:
[T]he situation of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances at the time
the contract was made, may be shown by
such [parol] proof to apply the memorandum to the subject matter.
Here the parol evidence will show that the designated
price of $1,875,000 had a special meaning which was well known
to the parties.

The parties had agreed that the actual purchase

price was to be $2,000,000.

The parties further agreed to

reduce the purchase price to $1,875,000 with the express
stipulation that buyer would pay the commission of $12 5,000.
With a knowledge of these surroundings, the words of the Earnest
Money Agreement take on new life and meaning.

From the surrounding

circumstances we know that the intent of the parties was that
seller would receive a net of $1,875,000 directly, and that the
buyer would deliver $125,000 to broker as a commission (thereby
relieving the seller of any obligation or claim to pay those
commissions) .
Taken together with the surrounding circumstances,
the Earnest Money Agreement shows the formulae used by the
parties to set the commission:
1.

Sales price - $2,000,000 with seller
to pay commission;

2.

Price reduced to $1,875,000 with
buyer to pay commission;

3.

Commission equal to difference
between $2,000,000 and $1,875,000;

4.

Commission equal to $125,000.

Although there is authority contra, a number of
cases have heid that parol evidence may be used to determine
the amount of the commission:
Moore v. Borofeldt, 273 P. 1114 (Cal. 1929);
Caminettl v. National Guarantee Life Co.,
132 P.2d 318 (Cal. 1972) ;
Brunner v. Van's Markets, 229 P.2d 56
(Cal. 1951);
Herring v. Fisher, 242 P.2d 963 (Cal. 1952).
£f:
K.

Ferris v. Jennincs, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979).
Expiration or Abrogation of the Earnest Money Agreement
Does Not Nullify its Effect as a Note or Memorandum of
a Separate Oral Contract.
Defendant might contend that the Earnest Money

Agreement somehow expired or was abrogated by the parties.
Even if that is so, the Earnest Money Agreement could still be
valid for the sole purpose of satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
That exact issue was faced in the case of Carey v. McGinnis,
321 P.2d 626 (N.Mex. 1956).
In that case the broker had an oral agreement to sell
real estate.

An earnest money agreement was signed between

buyer and seller.

The earnest money agreement contained a

reference to brokerage commissions.

The broker contended that

the agreement was a sufficient memorandum to take the transaction
outside of the statute.

The defendant contended that the property

was never sold and that the earnest money agreement was a nullity.
The court responded that:
It is immaterial as between the plaintiffs
and the defendant that no enforceable

contract was ever consummated between
the owner and the prospective purchaser.
The fact remains that defendants'
written binder contained all the
essential terms and conditions
of their agreement with the plaintiffs, including the commission to
be paid and to whom. The instrument is signed by both the defendants
and the plaintiffs. It is a 'memorandum or note* meeting fully the
foregoing statute [of frauds].
321 P.2d at 627-26.
I.

The Identity of the Broker Was Well Understood By All
Parties.
The Earnest Money Agreement does not identify plaintiffs

Mel Trimble Realty or Cal Florence as the broker.
not fatal.

However, that is

As stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia:
The absence in the contract of the
name of the broker is not fatal to his
claim. There was only one broker
associated with the transaction ....
Moran v. Audette, 217 A.2d 653,
654 (1966).
J.

Utah Cases Generally Support Plaintiffs' Claim Under
the Statute of Frauds.
The Utah case most nearly in point is Ney v. Harrison,

5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956).

In that case the court

was faced with an identical issue—that is, whether notations
on an earnest money agreement constituted a sufficient memorandum
to take the contract outside the statute of frauds.
In Ney at 218, the court held that the following
language satisfied the Statute of

Frauds:

The seller agrees in consideration
of the efforts of the agent in procuring
a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission
equal to the minimum recommended by the
Salt Lake Real Estate Board. In the event
seller has entered into a listing contract
with any other agent and said contract is
presently effective, this paragraph will be
of no force and effect.
* * *
Wasatch Homes is to receive a commission
of 2 1/2% which is Total Commission.

The court then went on to explain its analysis:
We are cognizant that decisions of
courts have varied widely as to the
sufficiency of writings which will suffice
to meet the Statute of Frauds. Many of
the decisions are explainable on the
basis of substantial differences in the
statutory provisions and terminologies,
and in factual distinctions. But the
explanation of other decisions lies only
in which of the two policies implicit
in the statute the particular court
felt was paramount: The protection os
the landowner from the imposition of
spurious claims by real estate brokers,
or the necessity of protecting the broker,
who has rendered a bona fide service,
from being refused just compensation
for his work by the landowner.
In assaying whether the particular
writing meets the requirements of our
Statute, the problem is considerably
simplified if we carefully observe that
pur statuteT unlike that of many states,
poes not cai 1 for the
-co be in wri m a ; it is enouch if there
is 1 some not e or memo rancum the^rcof '
which evidences the contract. (Emphasis
£dded. )
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114
fifteen years later our Supreme Court suggested by
way of dictum that an earnest money agreement might satisfy
the Statute of Frauds even if the name of the broker and the
amount of the commission were omitted.

Richards v. Hodson,

26 Utah 2d"113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971).
Other Utah cases in non-broker matters have taken
a similar view.

In the case of Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d

321, the plaintiff sought to enforce an oral agreement.

The

parol contract was admittedly within the Statute of Frauds.
However, plaintiff produced certain letters which were claimed
to be a sufficient memorandum to take the case outside of the
statute.

In that case the letters were very sketchy.

Plaintiff

relied upon the following letter to take the promise outside
the Statute of Frauds:
I think we should go ahead as fast
as possible on a government loan, however,
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if Slim gets the necessary noney to
reach our objective ....
... Then if we hit and form a
company. If there is only two of us
then you shall have a half interest
and myself a half interest «... We
don't have anything yet going in order
to form a company, and I know I trust
you and you trust me, but keep this
letter as a legal paper because this
is written down in my handwriting and
everyone wants something written down
spelling out their interest. Once we
can really start mining I think it will
make us well off and it might make us
rich. Until then, we will have to keep
plugging away.
Note that the letter only talked about a possible agreement in
the future "... if we hit and form a company."

The court

expressly noted that:
[T]hese letters do not precisely
set forth the agreement nor do
they describe the claim ....
Nevertheless the Utah Supreme Court held that they were a
"sufficient" memo to satisfy the statute.

In this case the

Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit "A") is far more complete and
detailed than the memo approved in Peterson.
In summary, plaintiffs

suggest that there is no

mechanical formulae which the court can apply to determine
whether any given note or memorandum will satisfy the Statute
of Frauds.

However, Utah courts have generally followed the

spirit of Williston on Contracts § 567A that:
Therefore, if after a consideration of
the surrounding circumstances, the
pertinent facts and all the evidence
in a particular case, the court concludes
that enforcement of the agreement will
not subject the defendant to fraudulent
claims, the purpose of the Statute will
best be served by holding the note or
memorandum sufficient even though it
be ambiguous or incomplete.
DATED this 11th day of September, 19 79.

ROBERT J. DE BRY
VALDEN P. LIVINGSTON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 276-4439

not

an

appropriate

deLense

when

ten

undelying

contract

is

» i u n p 1 «• t <•(!.

Thus, in light o£ facts supporting

the allegation of a

sufficient written memorandum and of a fully executed contract,
defendants' motion to dismissed based on the Statute of Frauds
should not be granted.

At the very least, plaintiff is entitled

to havr the Coin l consider t ho i«sue interpreting

J.acts most

tn vol able to plaintili's claim.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS HEREIN WERE NOT
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO THE
PRIOR CASE AND PLAINTIFF SHOULD
NOT BE PROHIBITED FROM BRINGING
A .SUBSEQUENT ACTION AGAINST THEM
Deiendantii

argue

in

their

Statement

of

Points

and

Authorities in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss that these
defendants must be considered

"indispensable parties" to the

prior action and that plaintiff has waived his right to bring a
subsequent

action

against

them, having

failed

to

join

them

previously.
However, defendants1 agrument fails for the reason that had
the defendants truly been "indispensable" to the prior action,
the court would have been unable to resolve the issues without
thier joinder.

Inasmuch as the court could resolve the issues in

their absence, their joinder was not required.

Rule 19

of the1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is instructive on the issue ofi
"indispensable parties".
These defendants would appear to be proper but not necessary
parties with the effect that failure of their joinder in the:
previous car.c would not preclude action against them now, but
only with the effect that the prior judment would not affect
their rights and liabilities.
POINT IV
QUANTUM MERUIT IS A PROPER REMEDY
IN THIS CASE ON THE THEORY OF SALE
OK f.KCURITIES
Plaintiff's

Complaint

includes

an

alternative

cause

of

action based upon quantum meruit for compensation for services
performed in connection with the sale of the stock of Monte Vista
Kanch, Inc. i'luni uliran and ohlers to Fitzgerald.

This Second

already submitted in this case.

In this case, plaintiff has

indicated that a sufficient memorandum exists in the form of
defendant Wallace Ohran's in-court admission of the existence and
terms of the contract.
Plaintiff's

prior

Statement

of

Points

and

Authorities

pointed out several authorities for this position, but further
authority is found in the case of the Estate of Meledandri,
437 N.Y. Supp. 2d 996 (1981).

In addition, statements made by a

defendant in depositions may satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
URSA Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Trent, 58 111. App. 3d 930, 374
N.E. 2d 1123 (1978); Young v. Tuck, 178 S.W. 2d 86 (Tenn. 1943);
Huffine v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W. 80 (1923).
Also,

in

contract.

this

case

the

parties

partially

executed

the

The only unexecuted part of the contract was payment

to the plaintiff.

This partial execution acts as an exception to

the Statute of Frauds.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF
UNDER QUANTUM MERUIT
In this case, a sale of securities (the stock and assets of
defendant Monte Vista Ranch) may allow the plaintiff, as agent,
to recover in quantum meruit for its time and expenses involved
in arranging the sale.

Such recovery is not precluded by the

Young case cited by defendants.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF MAY BRING THIS
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS HEREIN
Defendants argue that plaintiff should have sued the defendants

in

the

prior

action.

Perhaps

it

would

have

been

appropriate for plaintiff to name the defendants in the prior
action.
plaintiff

However, it is a time honored

rule

of

lav; that a

is entitled to his day in court and should not be

denied an opportunity to be heard so long as he follows proper
procedures.

Any joinder of the defendants in the prior action

